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Introduction
The Center for Advanced Computation of the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign is preparing a three year research plan to
develop network data management and resource sharing technology for
application in the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)
intercomputer network. This work is supported by the Joint Technical
Support Activity of the Defense Communications Agency.
In order to provide a better understanding of several research
areas of particular importance to WWMCCS, we have carried out four pre-
liminary research studies. These are in the areas of
1) automatic clustering and partitioning,
2) resilient protocols,
3) automated backups, and
4) intelligent terminals; i.e., terminal resident processing.
This report contains the working papers which describe the four studies
and their results.
In these preliminary studies, we have made a particular effort
to identify promising approaches, unpromising approaches, potential
difficulties, and technology interdependencies. The primary goal was to
provide input to the three year research plan rather than to perform the
research which will be a part of that plan. The short time available
did not allow us to pursue the research studies in the depth required to
answer questions definitively. Thus our conclusions are necessarily
tentative. We do, however, feel that we have achieved the better
understanding that was the goal of these studies.

Dynamic Data Clustering and Partitioning
Principal Author:
Geneva G. Belford
Working Paper

Dynamic Data Clustering and Partitioning
Summary
The Problem . Data base systems traditionally store records of
data in large physical blocks. Each I/O operation transfers a whole
block. Usually, only a few of the records in a block are actually used
to answer a query. Of the usable records, only a few of the fields may
be needed. As a result, very little of the data transferred by a given
I/O operation is utilized for the query (l%-5% utilization is common)
.
Furthermore, starting and terminating I/O operations is 50% of the CPU
load in the average ADP shop. The total effect of low data utilization
is to sharply increase response time (the DMS is I/O bound waiting for
useless data to be transferred) and also to increase CPU time (more I/O
operations are required because the usable data is sparse)
.
Substantial reductions can be made in response time, CPU load,
and costs if data are physically structured on the basis of actual usage
patterns for more efficient search and retrieval. In a rapidly changing
situation, a facility for automatic, dynamic restructuring would be
invaluable.
One technique of data organization that would play an im-
portant role in any such facility is data clustering or partitioning .
These two terms describe roughly the same idea - the grouping together
of related data items. The difference is that clustering is from the
point of view of combining individual items (or small groups of items)
,
while partitioning is from the point of view of subdividing a whole data
base (or large portion thereof). The important point is that large
gains may be made by subdividing the data base in such a way that the
system need only search some small portion of the data to answer a
particular query. In addition, an effective algorithm for subdivision
5
Is a necessary preliminary to allocating portions of a large data base
among various memory storage devices or among various network sites.
Results of this Preliminary Study . Dynamic restructuring of
large data bases is feasible. We have examined existing algorithms for
clustering data on the basis of query patterns (i.e., grouping together
items which are frequently retrieved together) . There is a key difficulty
in applying existing algorithms to large data bases and in response to
changing query patterns. The collection of statistical data to determine
the query patterns can be overwhelming. We propose a solution to this
problem - a new technique which we call dynamic query clustering .
Although much work needs to be done on algorithmic details, guidelines
for parameter choices, etc., we feel that a foundation has been laid for
developing data clustering as an effective tool in the management of
large data bases.
Introduction
Although there have been a number of studies of techniques for
clustering data, none has been from the dynamic point of view; i.e., from
the point of view of how the data may be restructured in response to
changing usage patterns. The goal of this research study has been to
look at the currently available data clustering methods and to determine
whether it is feasible to design a dynamic approach to data clustering.
Before proceeding with a brief review of past work on data clustering,
it seems appropriate to provide the reader with at least an intuitive
idea of mathematical clustering terminology.
Clustering . Clustering is basically a geometric concept.
There is no problem in visualizing, for example, a cluster of houses.
One sees a group of houses, relatively close together, and probably
separated by some greater distance from isolated houses or other housing
clusters. This basic intuitive picture may be abstracted to a graph of
points in a plane, as shown below.
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Intuitively, the graph shows two clusters. For clarity, we have encircled'
these and labeled them A and B.
Now any algorithm for determining clusters begins simply with
the points, specified by their coordinates, and a definition of a metric
or distance measure (e.g., the usual Euclidean distance in the plane).
Points are then assigned iteratively to clusters until a static, con-
sistent picture emerges. For example, the nearest-centroid-type algorithm
run something like the following. An arbitrary number of clusters and
proposed cluster centroids (in the usual geometric sense) are chosen.
In the figure above, suppose we choose the points labeled '1' and '2' as
centroids. All points are then assigned to the cluster having the
nearest centroid. Notice that this assigns one or two points from
"obvious" cluster A to cluster B. But now the centroids of the clusters
thus far obtained are computed. The centroids for both clusters shift
left; a reassignment of the points will leave us with clusters A and B
as drawn. A repetition of the centroid computation and point assignment
cycle will show no change, and the algorithm terminates. Many variations
on this simple scheme are possible; for a readable, comprehensive discussia
of clustering algorithms, see [Anderberg, 1973].
Clustering for Document Retrieval . Much of the past work on
data clustering has been done in the context of document retrieval. In
this context, one usually wishes to retrieve a whole list of documents,
all those pertaining to a certain set of key words or otherwise having
some prescribed attributes. Ordinarily it is not required that the
retrieval set be perfect; i.e., a good system may overlook some relevant
documents while it retrieves other documents peripheral to the interests
of the person making the request. It is also reasonable that a document
retrieval system be static; that is, items and query types change sufficieti
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slowly that an optimal organization may be selected a. priori and changed
only at long time intervals, if ever.
The usual approach to document retrieval runs somewhat as
follows. (See, for example, [Jardine and van Rijsbergen, 1971], [van
Rijsbergen, 1971], and [van Rijsbergen, 1974].) Associated with each
document is a list of relevant keywords. A matrix M is constructed
which indicates which documents have which keywords. That is, element
M . of M is defined by
M. , = 1, if keyword i is associated with document j ;
M. . = 0, otherwise.
The jth column of this matrix is then a binary vector which in a sense
describes the content of document j . Documents with similar content are
then clustered together. (For a discussion of clustering metrics for
binary vectors, see [Anderberg, 1973].) A query, or retrieval request,
is then matched against cluster representatives (vectors describing a
typical, or average, member of each cluster), and the whole cluster or
clusters corresponding to the closest match are returned.
Clustering based on Query Data . Recently, suggestions have
been made that clustering be based not on a, priori data characteristics
but on observed queries. In this way items frequently retrieved to-
gether may be grouped together, irrespective of their content. Casey
[1973] defines a matrix Q as follows:
Q, . = 1, if query i retrieves item j;
Q. . = 0, otherwise.
11
The jth column of Q is a response pattern, or binary vector indicating
by which queries item j is retrieved. Items are now readily clustered
according to the closeness or similarity of their response patterns.
The algorithm used may be identical to one used for document clustering
on the basis of keywords; only the meaning of the binary vectors assoc-
iated with the data have been changed.
Clustering on the basis of response patterns has the potential
for being useful for dynamic structuring. Queries can be monitored over
some time period, and a matrix Q generated. The data can then be organ-
ized (or reorganized) on the basis of clusters obtained from an analysis
of Q. Such reorganization, if done periodically, should respond well to
changes in types of queries and retrieval requests.
The problem with using Casey's matrix Q for dynamic restructur-
,
a
ing is that Q is unmanageably large for even moderate-sized data bases
and a query set big enough to be statistically significant. In the
preliminary research effort, we have therefore concentrated on determin-
ing whether a more practical variation on this procedure can be devised.
The Research Study
Background Considerations . Careful consideration convinced us
that Casey's Q-matrix approach to data clustering is basically sound.
The problem is to accumulate equivalent information without storing and
handling the gigantic Q-matrix itself. We found the key to solving this
problem in a four-year-old paper [Denning and Eisenstein, 1971] that has
somehow not made nearly the impact on computer systems analysis that it
should have. Denning and Eisenstein propose that sequential statistical
estimation algorithms, well-known in other contexts, should be used for
computer performance monitoring problems. They consider a sequence of
observed events for which certain statistical properties are to be
deduced. They emphasize that "the estimates should be formed sequen-
tially and should involve as little storage and overhead as possible.
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That way performance evaluation can be done on-line with little disrup-
tion of the main operation." In our case the observed events are the
queries and the items retrieved in response to them; essentially, the
rows of Q. We wish, therefore, to collect statistical information on
the queries as they arrive in the system.
Having discarded the computation of a single "average query"
as being relatively useless for our purposes, we hit on the idea of
dynamically clustering the queries on the basis of distances between
rows of Q. In this scheme, each query is added to the appropriate old
cluster (or used as the nucleus of a new cluster) as it is entered into
the system. In this way a good statistical summary of query data is
accumulated as the system is being used. The discussion below will
clarify the scheme.
The Dynamic Query Clustering Algorithm . Let q . be the i row
of Q; i.e., the binary vector indicating the set of items retrieved by
the query i. Our goal is to generate a set of query patterns p , p , .
. . .
from the observed queries q , q , . . . . To do this we propose
that vectors q. be clustered and the cluster "centroids" used as query
patterns. One then does not need to store the cluster members them-
selves but only the patterns p. and the number (c, ) of queries which
have been incorporated into cluster i. The clustering scheme we suggest
is of the "nearest centroid" type, in which each vector in turn is added
to the cluster whose centroid is nearest. Following each addition, the
cluster centroid is recomputed.
For the distance ||q. - q.|l between two vectors we propose
11
Notice that this is very efficient to compute; for binary vectors it
simply reduces to the familiar Hamming distance. Since clustering is to
be done dynamically, no patterns (centroids) are assumed a priori . Some
way to start new clusters is therefore needed. To do this, we suggest
choosing a parameter D and specifying that any query vector farther than
D from all previous centroids should begin a new cluster.
Monitoring the queries q , q , . . . .as they appear, one may
then proceed as follows:
1. Let p = q^ . Let the associated query count c = 1.
2. Compute
|
|q - p | 1= d. If d^D, then add q- to the first
cluster. To do this, set c = 2, and recompute p = (q + q )/2.
If d>D, set P2 = q , c™ = 1.
3. For i = 3, 4, . . . : Compute d. e|| q. - p.|j, j = 1, 2,
. .
.
, n, where n is the number of query patterns in the current list.
If d.:^D for some j, add q. to cluster j, updating the listing of query
pattern j according to
p.' = (c.p. + q.)/(c. + 1)
J 2 3 1 J
(p.', c' replace p., c. in the listing.)
If more than one value of j qualifies, choose the cluster for
which d. is smallest. If d, > D for all j, then set p , -, = q . ,
J J "^n + 1 ^1'
c
. T
= 1, and increase the pattern counter n by one.
n + 1
After a certain number of queries have been monitored, a list
of query patterns p , . . . , p and associated counts c , . . . , c will
have been generated. This information can then be used in any convenient
way to cluster the data items. It is important to notice that real
statistical information has been generated. Component k of query pattern
12
i Is the proportion of the time that a query of type i has retrieved
item k, and hence is the probability (or expected value) of retrieval of
item k by a query of type i in future.
Example . The following example should help to clarify the
process. Suppose that a file of ten records is to be subdivided into
clusters. Let D = 3, and suppose that the first query retrieves records
number 1 and 4. Then step 1 of the algorithm produces
V-^ = \ = (1> 0. 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and c^ = 1.
Now suppose that the next query retrieves records 1, 3, 4, 5, so that
q^ = (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Then, following step 3,
| |p^ - q | | = 2, and q is added to the first
cluster. Thus
p^' = (1, 0, |, 1, |, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) and c^' = 2.
At this point there is a single query pattern which has appeared twice,
and has expected value 1 of retrieving records 1, 4 and expected
value 1/2 of retrieving records 3, 5. Next, suppose
^r,
~ (1> 0> 0> 0>
1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1). Computation yields
|
|p - Qo | | =6, and so p = q
and c„ = 1. If the next four queries observed are
q^ = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)
q^ = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1)
q^ = (1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
q^ = (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0),
no additional patterns are generated and the query pattern list after
the first seven queries is:
3 13 1 1
V-^ = (4"' 2"' "4' ''4'' ^' ^' °' °' 4"^ ^^'^ ^1 " ^'
P2 = (|, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, ^, 0, |) and c^ = 3.
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A Refinement; Cluster Merging . An obvious problem with the
basic clustering scheme described above is that the process may produce
too many clusters. For example, two clusters whose centers are origin-
ally far apart may grow by accretion towards one another, so that in any
overview they would appear to be a single cluster. This problem can be
readily taken care of. Simply introduce another parameter L and period-
ically compute the distances between query patterns, merging any pair
p
. , p . for which lip. -p.|| ^L.
Making the Scheme Responsive: the Close-down Problem . For
dynamic clustering the query patterns should change with time. Unfor-
tunately, the statistical data collection procedure described above
closes down [Denning and Eisenstein, 1971]. This means, in our particular
case, that as the query counts c. become large the query patterns tend
to become static, since each new query is added in with weight l/c.
Periodic Initialization . One way to circumvent the close-down
problem would be to restart the data collection process occasionally
(e.g., after every T queries). Instead of starting from scratch, however,
one would probably want to save the old cluster centroids as initial
values for the new. This might be done as follows.
Choose two more parameters, a significance threshold t and a
minimal count c. For each i, compare c, with c. If c.<c, throw away
pattern p.. Otherwise save pattern p. but in binary form, with I's
replacing all components greater than t and O's replacing components
less than t. Such periodic initializing of the query pattern list will
cause the list to adapt readily to changing query patterns (e.g., in-
frequently used patterns disappear) and hence to provide a rational
basis for restructuring of the data.
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Because of the truncations involved, this restart process must
be examined for statistical validity. We have done so and found that,
although the initialization introduces a statistical bias, the process
is asymptotically unbiased, in the sense that this bias damps out as
queries are added to the cluster.
Responsive Estimators . Denning and Eisenstein discuss several
so-called responsive estimators , or unbiased statistical estimators
which shed the effects of early observations and do not close down. The
simplest of these is the moving-window estimator
,
in which running
averages are computed over the preceding T observations. The parameter
T is chosen to be large enough to get good statistics, but small enough
so that the average is sensitive to expected changes. Unfortunately,
the method requires storage of the last T observations. The straight-
forward analog in our case would be a reclustering after every query
based on the last T queries. This is clearly impractical. Restarting
our dynamic clustering process from scratch every T queries would also
be a valid analog of the moving window process. We noted above, however,
that it seems to make better sense to restart with good a^ priori cluster
centers, even at the expense of introducing a small amount of bias into
the statistics.
Exponential Estimators . A type of responsive estimator known
as an exponential estimator is, however, worth careful consideration.
The idea is the following. Suppose the observations are x
,
x
, . . . .
Our scheme for forming query patterns is equivalent to taking simple
averages of observations; i.e. computing
X, = (x + X2 + ... + X )/k.
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Now if the expected value of each x. is x (E(x.) = x) , then E(x ) = x;
this verifies that the estimator is unbiased. Computed, as we have
suggested, recursively, the averaging process can be written:
^1 = ^1
\ = \^l "•" ^\~\-i^^^' for k = 2, 3,... .
This can be generalized to
^1 " ^1'
\ = K-1 -^ \(V\-1>' ^=2,3,....
An easy induction proof shows that this estimator is unbiased for any
choice of constants a^,a-,''' . (See [Denning and Eisenstein, 1971].)
An exponential estimator is one for which a, is constant; in particular,
a, = a, where 0<a<l, for all k. The exponential dropoff in the weighting
of old observations is readily seen by writing out x, :
2
X, = ax + (l-a)ax + (1-a) ax _ +• • •
= X (l-a)*^"^ + a Z (l-a)V
. .1 i=o k-i
Introduction of this type of estimator into our query clustering scheme
is straightforward. In step 3, the calculation of p! is replaced by
pi = (1-a) p. + aq. .
Choosing a is clearly a nontrivial problem. The choice must be adjusted
to the rate at which query patterns are expected to change. Too small
an a will prevent the patterns from responding well to important changes.
Too large an a will cause the patterns to change rapidly and erratically
in response to minor query fluctuations. It is important to keep in
mind that we want query patterns , which are by definition averages over
classes of individual queries. This implies that a must be kept relative]
small. Denning and Eisenstein discuss the tradeoffs involved in choosing
in some detail.
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If an exponential estimator is used in collecting the query
data, no restart procedure is necessary and recent query counts are no
longer available for identifying patterns which should be deleted. On
the other hand, the counts c, no longer enter into the computation of
p!. It is therefore feasible to run counters which are restarted at
arbitrary regular intervals. Again, the length of time between re-
starting should depend upon how rapid the response to changing query
patterns should be.
Learning Estimators . Some of the problems which arise for an
exponential estimator can be solved by using a so-called learning
estimator . Such an estimator is defined by
^1 = ^1
(See [Denning and Eisenstein, 1971].)
The factors a may be chosen in various ways - e.g. a = a for an expo-
K. K.
nential-like estimator, or a = 1/k for an averaging estimator. The
factor p, is a learning factor defined by
P^ = a Pj^_^ + (l-a)Aj^, for k>0,
where
0<a<l, and
lo otherwise.
Notice that if successive observations are oscillating about the current
average, the factor p, grows smaller and has a damping effect on the
K.
corrections to the average. A reset procedure is necessary to keep p,
from eventually becoming so small that the estimator is no longer responsive.
17
The learning estimator is defined in the context of a sequence
of observations of a single variable. In query clustering, each ob-
servation is a vector, or set of variables. To use a learning estimator
effectively in query clustering might require that different factors pk
be carried for each vector component, and this would probably be pro-
hibitively expensive.
Conclusions and Plans for Future Work
We feel that this preliminary research study has been highly
successful in that the query clustering technique looks very promising.
Query clustering should solve one of the key problems of data clustering;
namely, how to efficiently collect data on usage patterns on which to
base the actual clustering of the data.
Data Clustering . Notice that we have not discussed how the
data itself may be clustered or structured. How best to use the query
patterns is an obvious topic for future research. We mention in passing
that the query patterns themselves suggest an immediate clustering of
items. For each query pattern p. for which c. is sufficiently large,
one may form a cluster consisting of all those items for which the
corresponding component of p. is greater than some prescribed minimal
value. In this way sets of items which have a high probability of being
retrieved together may be physically clustered together. The clusters
formed in this way are likely to overlap. Ordinarily, redundancy is
avoided as being wasteful of space. In this case, however, the overall
efficiency of the system may be better served by occasional repetition
of items.
Other, more sophisticated, clustering techniques may also turn
out to be useful and we plan to look into the various clustering methods.
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It is important to determine which ones are most promising for clustering
the data on the basis of query patterns. Clustering techniques are
abundant in the literature and it will require considerable investigation
to decide on the best way to proceed.
One aspect of data clustering that seems to be neglected in
the literature is the possibility of blocking the data vertically as
well as horizontally. That is, most clustering of data emphasizes the
grouping together of data items; it may be that one wants to group data
attributes as well. For example, in a personnel file, certain classes
of queries will call for salary and related financial information, while
others will call for job skills and experience. One should be able to
cluster queries on the basis of attributes retrieved as well as on the
basis of items retrieved. Queries clustered on the basis of attributes
retrieved should then provide the necessary information for vertical
blocking of the data base.
Refinement of the Query Clustering Technique . Our investiga-
tion into query clustering is only preliminary. Much needs to be done.
We have touched on several of the problems, such as how best to add
members to clusters dynamically while avoiding the statistical close-
down problem. It may also be that other clustering metrics or techniques
would work better. We have merely proposed a very simple, rapid approach,
Even if our clustering algorithm as specified turns out to be acceptable,
there remains the important question of choosing the many parameters in
the algorithm.
The values to be selected for the parameters will depend upon
a number of factors, including the use that one proposes to make of the
query data. Parameters D and L should clearly increase as the number of
19
items increases. In addition, as D and L increase (the number of items
being held constant) the number of query patterns will decrease and the
density of the query pattern vectors will increase. Whether or not this
effect is desirable depends upon the proposed application. On the other
hand, parameters c, t, and T could probably be selected without regard
to the number of items, but their effects are not independent of each
other. A relationship of the form t = rc/T, where r is a proportionality
factor in the neighborhood of unity, would seem reasonable. If a responsiv
estimator (such as the exponential estimator) is to be used, one must
decide on the parameters to be inserted into it. In short, careful
studies must be carried out to develop guidelines for precise algorithm
definition, including specification of parameters.
Tests and Simulations . Most of the questions raised above
cannot be answered without carrying out tests to determine the effects
of various parameter choices, algorithm variations, etc. Some of this
work may be done with fairly limited resources. That is, cursory con-
sideration of the obvious effects of certain choices may serve to
eliminate them from further consideration. Answering some questions '
will require simulation studies, making use of mathematical models of
the relevant processes and/or an experimental data-base simulation
system.
Cost Analyses . Clearly, extensive data restructuring will be
an expensive process. Guidelines for decisions on when to restructure,
as well as on how to restructure, will have to be developed from cost
analyses of models of the process. '
Such cost analyses can not be carried out for a clustering
algorithm in isolation but in the setting of an entire data base manage-
ment system. In a network, the data base may be assumed to be distribute'
20
The distribution of blocks of data will be based not only on the clustering
algorithm used to block the data but also on the file allocation algorithm
(including considerations such as security, data "ownership", etc.)*
The effect of any particular distribution is heavily dependent on the
entire data management system and its network environment. An overall
system model must be developed before valid cost effectiveness figures
can be generated and guidelines developed to determine when restructuring
is worthwhile.
One interesting aspect of data-structure cost that it will be
important to study is the tradeoff between retrieval cost and desired
accuracy of response. It may be that to guarantee a 100 percent accurate
response to a certain query the whole data base will need to be searched
to make sure that no relevant information has been overlooked. In other
cases, less accuracy is required and the search may be limited to a
small number of clusters. Notice that the data clustering scheme itself
enters in strongly here. For example, extensive overlapping of clusters
will allow most queries to be answered by a search of only a few clusters.
But this would be at the expense of more storage space and lengthier
searches in cases when the whole data base must be searched.
Interactions with Other Data Management Problems . As we
indicated above, data clustering can not be studied in isolation. It is
really only a small part of the whole data structuring and accessing
problem, which involves not only the problems of how to organize the
data and handle it rapidly (including the well-known tradeoff between
update and retrieval efficiency) , but also the problems of file allocation
(distribution of the data) . Most of these other problems have been more
extensively studied than has data clustering, although generally not in
21
a distributed environment. It should be possible, nevertheless, to
investigate various clustering alternatives in the context of a general
data management system based on reasonably well understood principles.
If certain alternatives chosen for the data management system turn out
to have a severe effect on the guidelines for clustering, such instabil-
ities in overall system configuration will be noted for further study.
This study should, in turn, lead to improved insights into how best to
design an overall distributed data management system.
22
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Resilient Protocols for Computer Networks
Summary
The Problem . If large-scale computer networks are to realize
their potential usefulness to any user community, it will be necessary
for networks to be more reliable than traditional computer systems. The
reliability of the individual components (the communications processors,
the communication lines, and the hosts) is about as high as the state of
the art allows. Therefore, the burden of increasing the reliability of
the network as a whole falls on how these components are arranged and
how they communicate. Here we are concerned with the latter. Specifically
we are interested in how network communications protocols can be designed
and implemented so that they are resilient to failures and to abuse by
aberrant or malicious software. In addition, it is important that we
attempt to gauge the cost in manpower and machine resources necessary to
achieve a particular level of reliability, if solutions are to be of any
practical use. Network failures should not cause a user's data to be
corrupted or service to a user to be interrupted. Similarly, a network
application should be protected from malicious attempts by other users
to interfere with its operation. Communication protocols are at the
heart of any distributed network application. If such applications are
to be accessible and reliable to use, the protocols and their implementations
must be resilient.
Results of this Preliminary Study . Our investigations have
shown that there is little understanding of the scope of what affects
the resiliency of a protocol. There are limited techniques that can
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be used to solve some problems [Postel, 1974(b)] and others are being
explored [Sunshine, 1974]. The largest single difficulty with the prac-
tical application of these protocols is providing a lucid yet unambiguous
definition that can be used by a diverse group of people. It is argued
below that a technique for the formal specification of protocols is the
key to the ability to verify protocols (lack of deadlocks and other
conditions) and their implementations (i.e., prove the implementation
implements the protocol) . Such a technique could be used to avoid
errors of interpretation when the protocol is analyzed or implemented,
or an implementation is tested or verified. Preliminary indications
seem to imply that fairly resilient designs can be no more expensive (in
both manpower and machine resources) than a non-resilient protocol; but
retrofitting existing protocols to be resilient can be much more expensive
than the cost of the original protocol implementation. It also may be
possible to adapt present methodologies so that estimates of the manpower
and resource requirements needed to implement the protocol can be made
from a formal specification.
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Introduction
The Need for Resiliency . Protocols of a resource sharing
computer network are the mortar that binds computers and communications
media Into a cohesive whole capable of resource sharing. To most people,
a protocol Is a set of rules governing conversation. They are usually
used In formal situations where there are many people wishing to speak
(perhaps at once) and/or there Is a chance of misunderstanding. In a
computer network, communication protocols are used for these reasons and
also to provide a common ground for dialogue. Crocker et al. [1972]
define a computer network protocol as follows: "When we have two processes
facing each other across some communication link, the protocol Is the
set of their agreements on the format and relative timing of messages to
be exchanged."
The recent development of several large-scale computer net-
works has seen the design and Implementation of computer network proto-
cols of a fairly high degree of sophistication. This experience, primarily
In the ARPANET, has shown several areas where our knowledge Is lacking.
Among these areas are deadlock or race detection, logical consistency,
efficiency, and error control. As the ARPANET became more a user facility
and less a researcher's experiment it was quickly apparent that if the
network was to provide reliable service, withstand component failures
with minimum discomfort to the user community, and maintain availability,
the network protocols would have to be more resilient to failures than
previously expected. Furthermore, it is not sufficient that the protocol
be defined so that it is resilient to abuse, but it is also necessary
that the specific implementations of the protocol be resilient not only
to other protocol implementations, but also to the environment (i.e.
operating system) in which it exists. In order to get a better feel
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for what can happen if a protocol or its implementation is not resilient,
let us consider some of the less well-known pieces of ARPANET folklore.
Some ARPANET Folklore . When the new Telnet protocol was
defined in 1973, socket 23 was defined as the contact socket for testing
new Telnet implementations. When UCSD was ready to test its new imple-
mentation, it was told to try it out by using UCSB's new implementation.
UCSD connected to UCSB's socket 23 and was inundated by output from
Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara had a core dump program, not the new
Telnet, on socket 23. This example illustrates the lack of sufficient
authentication facilities in the ARPANET'S Initial Connection Protocol.
No real harm was done in the cited case, but a pirate process at UCSB,
acting like a Telnet, could have collected usercodes and passwords
[Bartelmess, 1974].
There was also a period when every time ANTS connected to
Multics, Multics crashed. The problem appeared to center around the
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fact that ANTS sent allocates equal to 2 -1 bits. Multics tried to use
this number as a basis for local buffer allocation and a bug in the
memory allocation system caused it to die. As another example, at one
time tip's only stored the low order 16-bits of a 32-bit allocation.
This caused a deadlock situation when hosts (such as Multics) sent
1 fi
initial allocations greater than 2 -1 bits [Padlipsky, 1975]. For
16
example, if Multics sent an allocate of 2 bits the TIP would have
thought it was an allocate of zero bits and no data would be sent.
We could cite many, many more such pieces of folklore, but
these should serve to show what pitfalls confront the designer and
implementor of network protocols. As these examples illustrate, handling
various error cases in the definition of the protocol is only a first
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step in providing resiliency. It is also required that the protocol be
free of inconsistencies (there were some in FTP), that implementations
be defensively coded to avoid aberrant behavior when confronted with
"impossible" cases, and that implementations be shown to faithfully
implement the protocols.
We hope that the above discussion has left the reader with a
fairly good feel for what a resilient protocol might have to be. Let
us try to pin down the idea a little tighter.
Aspects of Resiliency . The situation can be pictured as shown
in Figure 1. Clearly we are interested in two main considerations, the
resiliency of the protocol itself and that of its implementation.
Considering the resiliency of one without the other would be a useless
exercise, since the reliable operation of the whole depends on the
measures taken in both to assure resiliency. There are essentially
three aspects of resiliency that must be considered. First is the
logical resiliency of the protocol. Is it free of deadlocks, races, and
logical inconsistencies? Is the protocol capable of supporting the
dialogue necessary to accomplish its purpose? A resilient protocol must
also address issues of communications resiliency . In most practical
situations, the dialogue between the two automata is carried through an
error-prone communications medium (such as a phone line) . Thus a protocol
must include rules for detecting and correcting messages damaged in
transmission. The techniques of error coding are fairly well understood
and will not be dealt with in any detail here. We simply note that any
level of reliability may be achieved at the cost of decreased bandwidth.
However, given that one will accept one error in every 10 messages or
allow a message with n errors to be undetected, the implementation must
consider what can happen when an error is not detected. This brings us
P
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to the more general problem of implementation resiliency . The implementa-
tion of a protocol must be able to detect, correct, or at least protect
itself from errors induced by the communications medium or by other
aberrant or malicious protocol implementations.
Some insight into the nature of a resilient protocol imple-
mentation can be gained by considering it as a translator translating
the common language of the protocol to the local representation. Figure
1 illustrates this situation. The input and output sets denoted in the
figure are the sets of all possible inputs and outputs that may be sent
on that channel. Typically only a subset of each of these constitutes
legal inputs or outputs of the protocol implementation. A sufficient
condition for an implementation to be resilient might be (by definition)
that it map any input into a legal output and next state. It is then
necessary to define what classes of next states and outputs illegal
inputs should be mapped to. More work on this sort of a characterization
may lead to a better understanding of the problems discussed here.
State of the Art . Some work has been done that may be applied
to the realization of resilient protocols. As mentioned above, most of
the problems of communications resiliency are well understood and any
degree of reliability may be attained as long as the price is acceptable.
The problems of logical resiliency are less well understood,
however. Postel [1974(b)] applied graph theoretic techniques to protocols
to detect deadlock and race conditions in them. He found that even a
simple but practical protocol had a graph of such complexity that analysis
was difficult and expensive. He then proposed the use of graph modules
to simplify these graphs and make them more tractable to analysis.
However, the gain in simplicity results in a loss of much of the parallel
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operation of the protocol. One must, therefore, assume, although Postel
does not mention it explicitly, that the process of applying the graph
module technique to simplify the analysis changes the definition of the
protocol. Nevertheless, within these restrictions, this technique could
be used to detect deadlocks and races .
Deadlocks and races do not, of course, cover all of the difficul-
ties that fall under the heading of logical resiliency. Another problem
is detecting lost or duplicate messages . Sunshine [1974] at Stanford
has recently begun working on this problem. He is investigating a class
of protocols known as Positive Acknowledgement/Retransmission (PAR) and
Sequencing PAR (SPAR) protocols. He shows that as long as the protocol
implementations are operating correctly a PAR or SPAR protocol can
detect lost or duplicate messages, but a failure at either end (say due
to a system crash) can cause messages to be lost or duplicates generated.
The major difficulty with problems of this kind is that the
domain in which these phenomena arise is not sufficiently understood for
prediction of what can happen. To date, identification of the pitfalls
and how they can arise has proceeded primarily by a process of enumeration.
This makes it very difficult to discern when the end of the list has «
been reached. Until a better understanding of the domain (or environment)
from which these pitfalls can be predicted is available, there is little
hope of being able to guarantee that the end of the list has been reached.
The techniques to aid in verifying implementation resiliency
are also in an early stage of development. There are several possi-
bilities in the offing. In the long term it may be possible to use
program proving systems to prove that an implementation really does
implement the protocol. (For a recent survey of the state of the art in
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program proving see [Elpas et al., 1972].) One of the primary difficulties
confronting the use of program provers is that they must be told what
the program is supposed to do. This description may actually be more
complicated (and therefore more prone to errors) than the program itself.
Another possibility that is practical in the short term and more pragmatic
in its approach is to develop a battery of tests and program exercisers
to be used to verify that an implementation works. Such tests could be
developed and applied by a network licensing service similar to the
Performance Measurement Laboratory described by Padlipsky et al. [1974].
Indeed there is a place for such a service in the long term in any large
computer network to provide testing and analysis functions for the net
and to ensure that protocols are obeyed.
The research areas relevant to resilient protocol development
are at a fairly early stage of investigation. However, it appears that
some of the major problem areas have been outlined and initial work has
been done that is applicable to the design of resilient communications
protocols.
Purpose of the Present Study . The purpose of the present
study is to gain a better understanding of what makes a protocol and its
implementation resilient and to determine what the major research problems
are and which problems can be solved to provide the greatest benefit.
Keeping these general goals in mind, we have analyzed an existing protocol
in an attempt to find out what general statements can be made about
resilient protocols and how research in other areas may facilitate the
development of resilient protocols. We have also considered, insofar as
possible, the relative cost of such protocols and the costs of retrofitting
existing protocols to make them resilient.
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The Research Study
Since there is no general understanding of what causes a
protocol to not be resilient, our first task was to try to gain a
better grasp of this aspect of the problem. Our approach has been to
take a protocol (in this case the ARPANET FTP) and carefully analyze it,
considering each part of it and how it could be made to fail. Clearly
this enumeration approach will not find all the ways the protocol or an
implementation can be made to fail, but it should provide sufficient
information on which generalizations can be based. The ARPANET File
Transfer Protocol (FTP) was chosen for this study because we believed it
to be sufficiently complex to show up most of the major kinds of problems
that can arise and yet small enough to be analyzed in the short amount
of time available to us. Also the kind of services that FTP performs
should make the discussion accessible to a larger audience and not
require our getting into the obscurities of communications theory to
illustrate a point. There are some problems that this analysis will not
address, because of the nature of FTP's; therefore, we feel that in
further research a careful analysis of host-host level protocols should
be made.
In what follows we will first discuss the assumptions we made,
why they are valid, and under what conditions they may be relaxed. We
will then give a brief overview of the ARPANET FTP for those who may not
be familar with it. The last part of this section contains a discussion
of a few of the more important resiliency problems found in the analysis.
A complete list of the possible problems uncovered by this work may be
found in Appendix 2 to this report.
Assumptions . In doing this analysis we assumed first of all
that all underlying protocols used by FTP (i.e., Telnet, host-host.
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etc.) were resilient. It was felt that without this assumption, the
complexity of the problem would increase immensely and perhaps tend to
blur major points. However, since one is often confronted with the
problem of not being able to change lower-level software that must be
built on, it is our feeling that the implications of relaxing this
assumption should be addressed in detail at a later time. But attacking
this problem will depend on a better formal understanding of the nature
of resilient protocols.
Our second assumption was that a particular implementation of
the protocol may assume that all errors that it may be confronted with
are due to the communications media or the remote implementation with
which it is corresponding - not to errors in itself. The only exception
to this rather solipsistic assumption is that the implementation may
wish to perform error checks on its internal tables to protect itself
from local memory or disk errors. Errors in the local implementation
can arise in two ways: bugs in the code or failure of the hardware.
Some extraordinary conditions can be detected by consistency checks on
operations. However, there is no guarantee that all errors can be
detected in this way. Detection of the second class of errors, except
possibly for the case previously mentioned, is not really the respon-
sibility of the protocol implementation, but of more basic fault detec-
tion parts of the host system. A recent paper by Kane and Yau [1975]
may provide a means for detecting software errors caused by either latent
bugs or hardware failure. Application of this technique to detecting
faults in a protocol implementation would require special hardware which,
without too much expense, could be attached to a minicomputer serving as
a front-end. (It is highly likely that adding such hardware to an exist-
ing medium-to-large scale machine would be rather expensive.) Kane and
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Yau show that a very high percentage of "errors" can be detected (greater
than 80%) with very little overhead (less than 15%). However, we feel
that these figures must be taken with a grain of salt. The class of
errors detected by this technique were introduced into a program at ran-
dom. It seems reasonable to assume that the kinds of errors that would
remain after normal debugging would not be randomly distributed through-
out the program and would not be caused by simple single error conditions.
Also, it is not clear if this model detects timing-dependent errors. This
approach to the problem of software fault detection holds promise, but more
work is needed for it to be applicable in a practical situation. A major
stumbling block raised by the detection of software faults, in the
context of a resilient protocol implementation, is what action should be
taken when a fault is detected. In most contexts, the program should
not be halted, since this could easily leave a user or users in a com-
promised state. There are as yet no clear solutions to this problem in
the general case.
An Overview of FTP . The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for the
ARPANET is a protocol used to facilitate moving whole files between
hosts (including TIP's). (The discussion of FTP here is a very cursory
overview to give the reader sufficient background to understand the
results of this study. For a more detailed description see [Neigus,
1973] and [Postel, 1974a].) The requirement that FTP be usable from a
TIP has significantly affected the form of the protocol. Specifically,
it was necessary to make the protocol commands and replies both machine
and human readable. FTP is based on the concept of a Network Virtual
File System (NVFS) . It provides facilities for renaming and deleting
files and listing directories, as well as for moving files.
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An FTP session is started when the user Protocol Interpreter
(PI) initiates a Telnet connection to the FTP contact socket according
to the Initial Connection Protocol (see Figure 2). This Telnet connection
is the path used to send commands to the server and to send replies to
these commands from the server to the user PI. All of the data sent on
this connection conforms to the ARPA Telnet protocol. Basically this
means that the data is a string of ASCII characters terminated by a
carraige return-line feed (CRLF) sequence, and that the Telnet commands
(program interrupt, etc.) are implemented. After the connection is
established and the server sends a reply indicating it is ready to
accept commands from the user, the user (through the user PI) sends four
character command identifiers followed by a parameter to the server PI.
(The User Interface can provide a more sophisticated interface to the
human user and the FTP PI. Here we will speak of the actual FTP commands
that are sent on the net and not the host-specific interface.) When the
server PI receives the command it takes the action indicated by the
command and sends a reply back to the user to inform him of the success
or failure of the command. An FTP reply consists of a three digit
machine readable code which enumerates the replies and indicates the
relative success or failure of the previous command. The code is fol-
lowed by text specific to the server's system that can give more de-
tailed information for a human user. The user PI is not allowed to send
another command until the reply to the last one is received. (The one
exception to this will be detailed later.) Thus, the user and server
carry on a dialogue of commands and replies over the Telnet connection.
The FTP commands fall into three major categories; access
control, transfer parameter, and service commands. The access control
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commands enable the FTP user to log onto the remote host. The transfer
parameter commands are used prior to a data transfer command to specify
certain characteristics of the file and the mechanics of the transfer.
For instance, these commands are used to tell the server what format,
character set (if relevant), or file structure the file about to be
transferred has. These commands are also used to specify the byte size,
what "socket" the data is to be sent to and how the data is to be encoded
for transmission. The service commands allow the deletion and renaming
of files, file transfer operations (retrieve, store, and append), the
restarting of interrupted transfers, status queries, and the listing of
directories.
To do a data transfer, the necessary transfer parameter
commands are sent to the server, then, before sending the data transfer
command which specifies the file and the direction it is to be moved,
the user PI requests a listen on its data socket. The user PI then
sends the data transfer command. The server PI upon receipt of the
command requests a connection to the user's data socket and gives responsi-
bility to its Data Transfer Process (DTP) to move the file over the data
connection (see Fig. 2). During the transfer the server may receive
certain commands on the Telnet connection (status, quit, abort, etc.) to
which it must respond. Also, the server may, during the course of a
transfer, send restart replies to the user to tell the user what the
last received block of data was. This allows the transfer to be restarted
if the transfer is interrupted because of a network failure or system
crash.
The FTP also allows a user at one host to transfer a file be-
tween two other hosts, neither of which is the user's host. This is
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generally referred to as a server-server interaction and is illustrated
in Figure 3. This technique requires that the user PI open separate
Telnet connections to each of the server Pi's involved. A sequence of
commands are then exchanged to coordinate which sockets are to be used
and which server is to listen for the connection from the other. Those
interested in the details of how this feat is accomplished should consult
the protocol definition [Neigus, 1973].
Basic Findings of this Study . In this section we will discuss
a few of the resiliency problems we found in the File Transfer Protocol.
A more complete list may be found in Appendix 2. The findings presented
here are intended to serve as an illustration of what can happen.
Proper Termination . After the user PI sends a BYE or QUIT
command to the server, the user PI should be prepared to close all
network connections. Although the protocol specifies that the responsi-
bility of closing connections falls on the server, it may not do it.
For example, although the ARPANET Telnet requires that the server close
the connection after the user logs off, only a few in fact do it.
Format Inconsistencies . It is possible for many bugs to turn
up in the various formatting commands such as TYPE, BYTE, or MODE. Per-
haps the easiest to point out is that the protocol does not specify the
character set translation tables. It is very easy to generate several
different translate tables for character sets, all of which are equally
reasonable. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Appendix
2. It may be fairly expensive to make a protocol resilient to these
kinds of errors. (Solutions would require a user and server to exchange
various test strings to convince themselves that the other was behaving
correctly.) However, for some environments these problems and others
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may be solved by more detailed specification of the protocol and/or by
having all implementations tested by a facility like the Performance
Measurement Laboratory [Padlipsky et al., 1974]. This solution requires
that the network be able to ensure that all implementations are tested
by the PML before being used with other implementations and that access
(i.e. the ability to connect) to servers is restricted to validated
processes
.
Restart . The FTP restart facility is probably the weakest
part of the entire protocol. Much of the definition of this facility is
left to the discretion of the implementors . This will undoubtedly
result in confusion over various points. Among the issues not addressed
are the security of the restart and the negotiation of the restart
point. The protocol does not specify how or even if the server is to
verify that a user attempting the restart is the same one that was
interrupted. There is also no way for the user to negotiate what the
last restart marker was in the event one end lost the last marker it was
supposed to have received. (See Appendix 2 for further discussion.)
Replies . The user PI should be prepared to receive a reply
even when it should not expect one. This event may appear to occur when
multi-line replies have format errors (see Appendix 2) . The user PI
should forward the text to the human user, if possible, and log the
event along with other relevant state information.
This gives a very brief idea of the kinds of problems that may
arise. It should be noted that the degree of resiliency and completeness
of a user implementation does not have to be as great as that of a
server implementation. A user community should be able to have a crude
implementation that provides minimal access as long as the users are
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aware of its limits and the implementation does not cause difficulties
for a server. On the other hand, a server implementation should provide
more complete facilities since it is supposed to be offering a service.
In the remainder of this paper, we will attempt to draw some meaning
from this enumeration of possible resilience problems discussed here and
in the Appendices and to indicate possible avenues of work that will
lead to a better understanding of the problems and to the ability to
develop resilient protocols.
Conclusions and Plans for Future Research
The purpose of this study has been to gain some insight into
the requirements for designing and verifying resilient protocols and
their implementations. A brief glance at the kinds of conditions (listed
above and in the Appendices) that a resilient protocol must be able to
handle will convince the reader of the great variety possible. As yet
there is very little one can do to characterize these conditions into
any sort of useful discipline. Initial attempts using automata models
lead to very general statements about which sets are mapped to which
other sets. Although these initial models help to clarify our understanding
of the problems they are of very little practical value. One point that
did seem common to many of the resiliency problems found in the analysis
was that many of the problems could have been avoided if a much more
detailed and rigorous definition of the protocol had been available.
The nature of the jargon used to describe computer operations makes
prose definitions of protocols highly susceptible to ambiguities and
misinterpretations
.
There is clearly a trade-off between cost and protocol resiliency.
The more resilient a protocol is, the more expensive in both manpower
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and computer resources it will be. As yet there are no real ideas of
exactly what the cost to resiliency ratio is. But designers are going
to have to determine what degree of resiliency is tolerable and determine
if the cost is reasonable. However, a word of caution and an argument
for overdesign is in order. Very preliminary investigations of the cost
of retrofitting protocols to make them resilient indicates that retrofitting
could require an increase in cost of at least a third over the original
protocol. This will depend, of course, on the resiliency of the original.
This estimate is based on size and manpower estimates for the proposed
solution [Kanodia, 1974] to the lost message problem in the present ARPA
Host-Host Protocol compared with estimates for the Inter-Net Protocol
[Cerf et al., 1974], which deals with the problem directly. The implementa-
tion of the Inter-Net Protocol, which handles problems of lost or duplicate
messages, appears to be no larger (and may be smaller for some hosts)
than the present Host-Host Protocol. However, retrofitting the Host-
Host Protocol to avoid this problem in any general way would require a
moderate amount of effort. The Inter-Net Protocol allows much more
efficient use of the NCP's buffering system than the extended Host-Host
Protocol. This implies that this solution would create a much greater
drain on computer resources for some systems and make full implementation
of the scheme unappealing.
Future work . This investigation has outlined several major
problem areas in the development of resilient protocols and has indicated
several avenues for future work. We will list these areas of future
work and then discuss them in greater detail:
1) analyze one or two lower level protocols
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2) develop a formal technique for specifying a protocol and a formal
system for characterizing protocols
3) investigate what general statements may be made about the action
to be taken when an error is detected
4) investigate in greater detail the problems of building resilient
protocols on top of unresilient protocols
5) investigate the possibility of using software physics techniques
[Halstead, 1972] to make estimates of manpower and computer
resource requirements for implementing protocols
6) investigate the role of a Performance Measurement Laboratory in
the testing and verification of protocol implementations
This research must be approached in some order. Clearly, 1)
and 2) must be done first and in that order, but after that the other
four items can be done in parallel or in any order an investigator
wishes to choose.
Further protocol analysis . As mentioned above many of the
more subtle resiliency problems are not found in FTP. Thus in order to
gain a better understanding of the scope of the problems involved, it is
advisable that a detailed analysis of one or two lower level protocols
(such as the Host-Host and Inter-Net) be undertaken. This analysis
would not only provide more data for characterizing resiliency problems,
but would also provide a chance for comparison of the resiliency of the
Inter Net Protocol with that of the Host-Host protocol with and without
the lost message detection extension. More detailed insight into cost
problems might thereby be gained.
Formal protocol specification . A pervading theme of this
paper has been the difficulty of concisely and unambiguously defining a
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protocol. A major source of confusion in previous protocol development
has been the inadequacy of a prose definition alone. It should be
possible to develop a rigorous protocol definition scheme that a human
can use as a basis for rigorous analysis. A major weakness with both
the graph theory analysis of protocols and present program verification
systems for proving protocol implementations correct is that errors may
be introduced when the definition of the protocol is transcribed to the
notation of the analytical model. It might be possible to avoid these
problems by using formal specification to define the protocol [Figure
4]. This would allow automata to be constructed to do the translation
to the other notations with much less chance of error. In fact, for
this very reason, the possibility of successfully applying program
proving techniques to protocol implementation is much greater than for
the more general program proving problem. Similarly, the formal speci-
fication could be used to automatically generate tests for protocol
implementation for a PML-like facility. For some systems it might be
possible to develop software systems to, at least in part (or with human
aid), transcribe directly from the definition to the implementation. In
addition to the formal definition of a protocol, it is very important to
consider the form a protocol document should take. For instance, the
prose definition, although ambiguous, is a necessary part of a protocol
document. It should provide the kind of narrative overview that makes
the formal definition easier to comprehend. Also, various cross-
reference aids, indices, testing and measurement criteria etc. may be
helpful.
The development of a rigorous protocol definition scheme will
provide both immediate and long term advantages. In the short term, it
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will provide designers and implementors with the kinds of rigorous
techniques needed for the development of protocol implementations by
diverse groups, and serve as a basis for immediate testing facilities.
In the longer term, it can be used to support various testing and verifica-
tion systems (for both protocols and their implementations) as these
technologies become available for practical use.
How does one arrive at such a formal specification scheme?
Some initial investigations into these problems have been done by Liskov
and Zilles [1975]. Many of their criteria apply to this problem. They
list criteria such as formality (lending itself to mathematical treatment)
,
constructability (capable of representing easily the major facets of the
domain being described) , comprehensibility (human readability) , minimality
(conciseness and lack of ambiguity), wide range of applicability, and
extensibility. The latter is especially important for protocol specifica-
tion, where objects are built on other objects, and readability is
significantly increased if lower level objects may be treated as atoms.
We hope that the analyses in this paper and similar work in the future
will help to characterize how these criteria may be incorporated into
precise definitions. Liskov and Zilles [1975] discuss several possible
techniques, ranging from state machine models to algebraic definitions.
Unfortunately none of these techniques are capable of describing concurrent
or parallel systems. Thus further work will be necessary to develop
schemes that can. It may be possible to adapt the Petri net to this
problem, but the Petri net does not, by itself, satisfy the criteria.
Also the work of Postel [1974b] and Sunshine [1974] may provide significant
insights into aspects of this problem. In addition to rigorously specifying
protocols, it is very important that further work along the lines of
49
Post el and Sunshine be capable of being represented by the specification.
Much more work is needed to explore the properties of these protocols.
Error response . When a protocol implementation detects a
failure, it is the nature of the response to this failure that deter-
mines whether or not the implementation is resilient. At present there
is no clear way to characterize what constitutes a proper response.
More work on this problem would make the design of resilient protocols a
much easier task.
Layering of protocols . One of the assumptions made for the
above analysis was that underlying protocols were resilient. It is
necessary for pragmatic reasons to investigate how this assumption may
be relaxed and what affect this has on the protocol being described.
Initial considerations indicate that if a lower level protocol is not
resilient with respect to some condition or is resilient to the condition
to some degree, then a protocol built on this lower level one that is
satisfied (i.e. requires a degree of resiliency less than or equal to
the degree provided) with that degree of resiliency need not concern
itself with the condition. However, if the protocol wishes a greater
degree of resiliency, it must clearly handle it directly. It is not at
all clear whether this is possible all of the time.
Estimating resource requirements . An interesting development
in the area of computer science in recent years has been the software
physics techniques [Halstead, 1972] for quantifying programs and algorithms.
Among the results of this work has been a technique for estimating the
time required by a programmer to implement an algorithm, given that he
understands the algorithm to be implemented and the language to be used.
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Strangely enough, Halstead's calculations are remarkably good approxima-
tions. It might be plausible to apply this concept to a formal specifi-
cation to estimate manpower requirements for implementing a protocol.
However, the application of this technique will require some experimenta-
tion and will most likely be machine (or language) dependent unless ways
can be found to include machine or operating system properties in the
analysis. (For instance, Postel [1974c] found that ARPANET NCP's were
easier to write (and were smaller) on machines with good interprocess
communication systems.) As appealing as this possibility may be, it
must be considered a long shot.
The role of independent testing . Without the existence of
program proving systems (and there don't appear to be any available for
practical use in the near future) , the only technique left to verify
that protocol implementations are faithfully representing the protocol
is to develop testing procedures that determine if the implementation at
least appears to act correctly when given the tests. (This is a weak
form of "correctness".) Each network must solve these problems in the
context of its operating environment, but one idea that does have fairly
general application is the Performance Measurement Laboratory described
by Padlipsky et al. [1974]. The PML is the logical focal point for the
testing and verification of protocol implementations as well as the
measurement of their effectiveness. There are many very touchy policy
problems associated with the concept of a PML regardless of the intended
environment; however, we will only concern ourselves with the more
tractable issues here. The PML facility would be responsible for generating
tests to prove that the implementation worked and was resilient to the
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degree specified by the protocol. (It may be desirable to have these
tests made part of the specification.) In addition, it might be necessary
to generate batteries of tests that were machine specific, so that
machine dependent errors could be detected (e.g. those deriving from
mappings between incompatible word or byte boundaries).
In addition to these research areas, researchers working on
these problems must also keep abreast of new work in the areas of program
verification, automatic test generation, and software fault detection.
These areas can be of relevance to resiliency problems as they reach
higher degrees of development.
The problems of resilient protocol design are as yet only
barely understood. We have reviewed some of our initial findings and
feelings on the subject and have suggested some directions for future
research. Foremost among these has been the need for a formal specifi-
cation scheme for describing protocols. The solutions to all of these
problems are at the core of the successful operation of any distributed
network application.
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Appendix 1
Some ARPANET Folklore
This appendix contains some examples of the kinds of problems
that did arise on occasion in the ARPANET. The incidents listed here
and above in the text are not intended to reflect favorably or unfavor-
ably on any host or group. Everyone involved with the ARPANET effort
has made mistakes. The lessons that the reader should learn from this
appendix and the following one are: 1) how easy it is for a definition
to be interpreted differently by different groups no matter how careful
the author of the definition was, and 2) the importance of careful and
thorough testing of protocol implementations.
Acknowledgement . We wish to thank colleagues Gary Grossman
(CAC), Ken Pogran (MIT), and Mike Padlipsky (Mitre) for suggesting items
to be included in this list.
ICP hole . The ARPANET Initial Connection Protocol allows
network server facilities to have a known "address" for accepting initial
service requests. This initial request results in the server's telling
the user which sockets to use for actual service. Following this step,
user and server open connections on those sockets. On one occasion ANTS
could not open a Telnet connection to Multics because the 32-bit number
Multics sent to indicate where to expect a connection from did not agree
with the one in the actual request for connection. The interesting
point is that no other user hosts were having the same problem. Apparently
no one but ANTS was checking to make sure the numbers agreed I
Format problems of host-host protocol . The host-host protocol
defines certain fields of message headers to contain zeros. The ANTS
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NCP recorded many cases where this requirement was not fulfilled. This
may seem a small problem; however, note that a very easy check to ensure
that hardware is not dropping bits is to check whether these fields are
zero.
Incomplete transmission . Multics was the first to act on
incomplete transmission notification from the IMP and retransmit. A
Multics implementor assumed that the IMP would notify him when a host
was down and that it was futile to continue sending. However, one host
(Utah) had wired the ready line "on" so that it always appeared to the
IMP as if it were up.
Frequent queries . One host decided to probe all other hosts
with an echo command every minute, just to assure itself that they were
still there. This caused some hosts to experience large increases in
cost due to the increased traffic. Notice that no protocol requirements
were violated, and there was no malicious intent. This example indicates
how a foreign program could in the extreme case severely impair a server's
operation. Server implementations must protect themselves against such
occurrences.
Logical inconsistencies . The earlier ARPANET FTP contained a
logical inconsistency for sending mail. The protocol said that a host
can require usercode and password before allowing any other commands.
At another point it said that mail should be free and suggested that
login not be required. This inconsistency caused a tremendous amount of
discussion on the network as to what "free" meant.
Allocation deadlock . At one time the TIP only stored bit
allocates in 16 bits. This caused some deadlock problems with hosts
that sent larger allocates.
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Order of Telnet connections . One Telnet implementor decided
that only a fool would open one side of a connection and then wait for
the other, so he merely waited for both before sending replies for them.
Another implementor decided that only a fool would wait for both, so he
would send one and wait for the reply before sending the other. The
protocol itself did not address the issue at all.
Incorrect contact socket . When checking out a new Telnet
implementation for UCSD, the programmer at UCSD connected to the experimental
Telnet contact socket at UCSB and received a core dump from the other
side. Systems, that don't limit access to contact sockets for services
they don't provide, leave open the possibility of a pirate process'
listening on these sockets. Such a process might simulate the desired
service just long enough to compromise the unsuspecting user (for example,
by getting his usercode and password)
.
Queuing vs. rejecting RFC's . The fact that the host-host
protocol does not specify whether Requests for Connections from foreign
hosts for which there is no corresponding listen should be queued or
rejected has caused some implementation problems between hosts that
viewed the solution differently.
Translate tables . When the TIP was extended to support the
IBM 2741, the EBCDIC to ASCII translate tables used by the TIP were
incompatible with the Multics conventions or the ANSI standard conven-
tions, both of which had been in use for some time. This point comple-
ments well a similar point made in Appendix 2. There were as many
reasonable arguments for the TIP's mapping as any other; the problem was
that no standard had been agreed on.
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Appendix 2
Potential Resiliency Problems in the ARPANET FTP
This appendix contains a partial list of the kinds of resiliency
problems that appear in even a fairly successful protocol. The list
presented here does not pretend to be complete. Also, not all of the
items presented represent failures of the protocol itself. Many indicate
the kinds of errors that may turn up during development or honest misunder-
standing of the spirit of the protocol. The sections of the appendix
deal with difficulties in the following areas:
Commands
Replies
Data Transfer
Transfer Restarting
Server-Server Transfers
Interfaces to Other System Functions
Implementation Notes
Commands
Command Form . Most of the problems that might arise with
command format, such as an unrecognized command name, illegal sjmtax, or
I
bad parameter values, have been considered by FTP. However, some problems
still exist. It is possible that a parameter has a perfectly valid
form; but the semantics of the parameter is either illegal or unreasonable.
Examples are pathnames that refer to data not accessible to a particular
user, or file allocation sizes that can not be used literally. It is
also possible for the improper use of sets of dependent commands to
generate states which are not specifically covered by the protocol.
J
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Command Sequences . In FTP, there are several instances where
one command must be preceded by another particular command. For example,
RNTO (rename to) must be preceded by a RNFR (rename from) . If this is
not the case the server is to send a "503 Bad sequence of commands"
reply. However, the protocol expects this reply only for the rename and
log on sequences, according to the "Revised Reply Codes" [Postel, 1974(a)].
The reply is not listed for the PASV command which is supposed to be
preceded by a SOCK command [Neigus, 1973, p. 43]. Also, the reply
should be listed for the data transfer commands (e.g. RETR, STOR, LIST,
etc.), since this reply could be generated in response to a restart
operation (see section on restart) . These are clearly oversights on the
part of the authors that are easily fixed, but it does serve to illustrate
how easy such oversights may creep in even with the most conscientiously
prepared definitions.
Password Security . A recurring problem in ARPA protocols is
that raw passwords are sent over the network. This problem may be
solved by systems' having separate passwords for network users. Each
network host could store these passwords encrypted irreversibly by the
same well-publicized polynomial. (See [Purdy, 1974] or [Evans et al.,
1974] for a description of these techniques.) User protocol implementations
could send the encrypted passwords to the protocol servers. However,
this solution assumes that only "official" protocol processes may open
connections to protocol servers. This assumption may not be valid in
many networks.
Placing Bounds on Commands . It may be prudent in systems
capable of dynamically allocating file sizes or record lengths to consider
ALLOcate commands declaring files larger than some upper bound as "very
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large" and either refusing to accept them or allocating space as the
data arrive rather than causing an excessive burden on system resources
by pre-allocating. This is especially true if the size is a wild guess
and the file is much smaller or the parameter has been corrupted and
represents a much larger number than intended.
Limits on FTP Environment . The SITE command allows the user
to send any site-specific command to the server and have the command
executed as part of the local command language. It is probably prudent
to suggest that implementors consider carefully what commands should be
accessible from the FTP environment. Also, the parameters should be
carefully scrutinized before being passed to the local command interpreter.
Duplicate File Conditions . When the user attempts to STORe or
rename a file using a pathname that already exists in the system, the
user should be given a 4xx reply, indicating that a file by that name
already exists. This forces the user to explicitly delete the previously
existing file (if he is allowed to) before performing the store or
rename and tends to confirm his intentions.
Replies
Basic Reply Difficulties . There are several occurrences that i
the user PI must be prepared to expect. '
1) A valid command that is damaged in transmission slips '^
t
i
through the lower-level error detecting mechanisms.
,
The most obvious solution is that the user should repeat ^
I'
the command a few times. If it continues to fail, an
error condition should be logged and the proper people
notified.
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2) When the user suspects the server sent a wrong reply, he
should attempt to utilize the information that is given
and log the occurrence.
3) The server sends the correct reply but it is damaged
in transmission. This state is indistinguishable from
the previous one from the point of view of the user PI.
It might, for environments where this could happen
relatively frequently, be worthwhile to have a command
to repeat the last reply. If this fails then the PI
should log the event, and attempt to continue.
Unexpected Replies . It may occur that the user PI receives
what appears to be a legal reply, but is in a state that indicates that
no reply is expected. (See comment on multi-line replies.) The user PI
should forward any text to the user, log the occurrence along with
relevant state information, and continue. (It may be relevant in some
contexts to take other action, in addition to this)
.
Unassigned Reply Codes . A reply with an unassigned reply code
and thus unknown meaning should not, in general, be a big problem, since
as long as the first two digits are each less than six, a gross meaning
may be implied, and the text can be forwarded to the human user for any
necessary action. However, if the first two digits don't make sense,
the user PI or other automaton can not make any decision as to the
validity of the reply. In this case, the user PI should probably treat
it as an error, give the user the entire message including reply code,
and perhaps log the condition along with other relevant information.
Multi-Line Replies . The FTP specifies that the format for
multi-line replies should be the reply code followed by a hyphen followed
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by text. The last line will begin with the same reply code followed by
a space, which is followed by the text. All intervening text lines may
start at the leftmost character position unless they begin with a number,
in which case they are indented at least three spaces to avoid confusing
the number with the last line indication. For example:
123-First line
Second line
234 Line beginning with numbers
123 Last line
Consider a server that fails to indent lines that begin with
numbers. Specifically, consider that the number might be identical to
the reply code for this reply. For example:
123-First line
Second line
123 Line beginning with numbers
Fourth line
123 Last line.
How does a correctly operating user PI handle this? There is
no way for the user PI to distinguish which is the real last line. If
the third line is considered to be the last, the user PI will interpret
the fourth line (and any subsequent lines) as a spontaneous system
message and the last line as a standard (although unexpected) reply.
For the user PI to respond to this condition with the least impact to
the human user, it should forward all text to the user; it should not
delete reply codes from final lines since these may contain useful
information for the user; and it should have a state for handling an
unexpected reply (q.v.). The only problem this presents to a user Pi's
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correct operation is that it might be fooled into sending another command
before the server completed sending the reply, which might cause the
server to act in an aberrant manner. This danger is best avoided by
requiring servers to queue at least one command.
Data Transfer
Command Sequence . The "503 bad sequence of commands" should
be added to the data transfer commands. This covers the case of the
command after a RESTart not being the one expected by the server.
If the user has a restart point the server does not know, no
mechanism is provided for the user and server to negotiate a restart
marker they do know.
Incorrect Defaults . It may be possible for the user or server
PI to assume the wrong default values. This might easily occur after a
REINtialize command and could cause one side to grossly misinterpret the
form of a data transfer. The only sure way to protect against this
occurrence is for the user to send commands establishing what it thinks
the "defaults" are before attempting a transfer.
Damaged SOCK Commands . A SOCKet command may become garbled in
transmission in such a way that the lower-level error detecting routines
do not catch it and the message still appears to be a valid SOCK command.
A server might then attempt to open a connection to the wrong socket and
hang waiting for the other side. This predicament is best alleviated by
placing an appropriate time-limit on a response from the other system.
Since this event has a fairly low probability of occurrence, some designers
may choose to ignore this possibility without significantly endangering
the operation of the protocol.
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Data Transfer Completion . It seems prudent to suggest that
the user PI should wait for both the data transfer to complete and the
completion reply to arrive before sending the next command, thus avoiding
any timing problems that might turn up.
Data Error Detection . If lower-level protocols are not sufficient
trustworthy, it might be wise for data sent on the FTP data connection
to have error checks, such as CRC's, or to sequence number the data to
protect against lost messages.
Data Listen Races . The protocol requires that the user PI do
a listen on the data socket before sending the data transfer command
[Neigus, 1973, p. 17]. Some implementations will refuse requests for
connections to a socket if there is no listen on that socket. Thus if
the user does not listen on the socket first, the worst that can happen
is that the data connection will be refused. In this case the server is
completely protected, but the user PI has a bug that may be averted by
repeated attempts to out-race the server's connection attempt, or by
notifying the maintainers of the server.
Listen Time-Outs . The user Pi's data transfer process should
place a time limit on the listen for the data connection, since the
server may try to connect to the wrong socket. Similarly, the server
should time-out his attempted connection in case the user is listening
on the wrong socket.
Data Transfer Abort Conditions . If the user data transfer
receives data that appears to be garbled, then it should send an ABORt
command and close the data connection.
If the server data transfer process notices the same condition,
the server should close the data connection and send an error reply
(perhaps a 426; although it does not really apply).
64
I
Data Format . There are several things that can go wrong with
the format of the data sent on the data connection. The solution to
most of these is to have a battery of tests run on each implementation
to certify that these problems do not exist. (See above.) Here we will
briefly mention some of the things that can go wrong.
Type . A host could have faulty translate tables between the
ASCII and EBCDIC character sets. This problem is not just a small bug
in a table; it is often not clear which ASCII codes should map to which
EBCDIC codes and vice versa. Furthermore, valid logical arguments can
be made for several possible mappings. In some cases, it might not even
be possible to retain the capability to perfectly invert the transformation.
Byte alignment problems may occur when transferring characters
with a transmission or logical byte size that is not equal to the character
frame size (i.e. eight bits) or the local word size. Tests for this
problem may be largely machine specific. (I.e., what sizes are most
likely to foul up this machine?)
Format . It is possible that the non-print form may not be
really transparent due to various reasons.
Systems that normally use ASA carriage control will have to
convert Telnet formatted files to ASCII before printing. It is possible
for this to be done incorrectly. Similarly, systems that normally use
ASCII format effectors for printing may err in converting ASA formatted
files for printing.
Depending on byte size and record length, some systems will
have to pad bytes or records or both with zeros in such a way that the
padding can be stripped off when the file is retrieved. This can of
course lead to errors that should be checked for.
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The local byte format lends itself to byte alignment problems,
especially if transmission byte size does not equal the local byte size.
It also must be verified that local byte formats are invertible . (This
again will require machine dependent tests)
.
Transmission Modes . The stream mode, the simplest of the
modes, is susceptible to improper escape convention encoding when record-
structured files are sent. The block mode can run into several other
problems: the descriptors can have illegal values; incorrect counts can
lead to a loss of synchrony; restart markers may be incorrectly packed;
and byte alignment problems can arise if the transmission byte size is
not convenient for either user or server. The compressed mode is also
susceptible to this last mentioned problem, as well as to the loss of
synchrony due to errors in the compression algorithm and the illegal use
of filler bytes.
Transfer Restarting .
State Information . Servers should also retain (across failures)
information on transfer parameters, command being acted on, etc., in
addition to restart markers. Thus when a user attempts to re-establish
the transfer, he should send the proper TYPE, BYTE, and MODE commands to
assure that both sides are using the same parameters.
The present FTP does not really allow for this. Presently the
REST command is sent with the proper marker followed by the interrupted
data transfer command. One might suggest that the server should then
compare its present transfer parameters with those stored with the
restart state to determine if the present operation is consistent with
the previous one.
I
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Additional Reply . There is no reply to indicate "restart
marker not found." Similarly, it might be worthwhile to define a method
for negotiating a restart point.
Possible Races Due to 10 Systems . Servers should try to
assure that restart markers have been written in a relatively safe place
before acknowledging the checkpoint (i.e., sending the I/O reply). In
other words, the server should make sure the marker has been written on
the disk and is not in a buffer before sending the restart marker reply
to the user.
Servers and users should probably keep at least the last two
restart markers to protect against a system failure while overwriting
the old marker.
Lifespan of an Interrupted Transfer . The state of an inter-
rupted FTP transfer should be saved for a period of several days before
being destroyed to give the user sufficient opportunity to complete the
task.
Semantics of Restart Markers . Consideration should be given
to the definition of the contents of the restart marker. For instance,
the marker could be defined to be the number of bytes or bits sent and a
session or process i.d. This is not unlike the message sequencing tech-
niques being proposed for other lower level protocols (e.g. Inter-Net
Protocol [Cerf et al., 1974]). This would allow either end to infer
various conditions about interrupted transfers and serve as a basis for
negotiation of a restart point. This would also allow restart with the
stream transmission mode in a crude form, since the server would only
have to count the bytes as they arrive, or look at the size of the file
after a failure to determine where things were.
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Restart Security . There is also the problem (not addressed by
the present protocol) of determining that the person requesting the
restart is indeed the same one that was transferring when the transfer
failed.
Server-Server Transfer
Data Connection Closing . There is a possibility of confusion
when the data connection is closed after a server-server transfer [Neigus,
1973] . It might be wise to make the following clarification: If the
active server intends to close the data connection it should be done
before the final reply (a 226) is sent to the user. '
Re-orienting the Server . The protocol should note that, after
a server-server transfer between host A and host B (see Figure 3) with B
the active server, the user will have to send a SOCK command to B before
attempting a transfer from B to C. In other words, the server must be
notified of the change in destination of the file.
Error Conditions . If one of the pathnames for the STORe or
RETR is invalid for one reason or another the user must back out of the
situation carefully. After the user receives the error reply he may try
to correct the error and re-send the command, or, if the user has sent a •
data transfer command to the other server, the user should send an ABORt
command to the server who sent the proper reply back to the user.
Interfaces to Other System Functions
Verifying Connections . It is necessary that the passive data
transfer process (or its NCP) be able to verify that the Request for
Connection on the data socket was issued by the correct FTP server. In
a typical case, if an FTP user was attempting to STORe a file and did
not verify who the connection was from, a pirate process might be able
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to open a connection to the data socket and steal a copy of the file.
The means of verifying the requestee exists within the host-host protocol,
but there is evidence (see Appendix 1) that the verification may not
always be done.
Bounds on Sessions . Servers should limit the number of simul-
taneous FTP sessions to some large but finite number. This is to protect
against malicious or aberrant remote programs looping on an ICP to
socket 3 and causing a significant drain on system resources. If the PI
faults, the NCP must be notified so that no connections are left hanging.
The NCP must verify that system calls for service to a socket actually
are requested by the process they are assigned to.
Handling Traffic on Both Connections Simultaneously . Some FTP
servers may not be able to monitor the Telnet and data connections
simultaneously, because of constraints imposed by operating system
architectures. Thus some special action is necessary to force the
server to service the Telnet connection. Such special action should be
studied carefully with respect to its effects in various systems.
Proper Termination . After the user PI sends a BYE or QUIT
command to the server, the user PI should be prepared to close all
network connections. Although the protocol specifies that the responsibility
of closing the connection falls on the server, it may not do it. For
example, although the ARPA Telnet requires that the server close the
connection after the user logs off, only a few hosts in fact do it
(UCLA-CCN, UCSD-CC, and Multics)
.
Implementation Notes
It may be wise in some environments for FTP processes to
perform a consistency check on its state tables. This would protect
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against spurious disk or memory failures and would be especially helpful
in recovering from system crashes. Generally this might be done by
check summing the tables. Check summing, of course, require re-
computing the check every time a new value is stored in the table and
also at frequent time-intervals when table modifications become infrequent.
Care must be taken that the table is not left in an inconsistent state
due to a system crash at an inappropriate time.
1
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The Problem . In a computer network, the need for reliable
and survivable access to a data base arises in many contexts . Important
examples are user authentication data, file catalog or directory data,
and accounting data. These examples are chosen because they emphasize
the fundamental nature of the requirement . Even if no application data
base ever needs to be available at a high level of reliability to
the network, the needs of the network for managing its own use and
resources justify, and in fact require, a high-reliability data base
maintenance facility. There are two obvious approaches to achieving
the necessary reliability. One is to use ultra-high-reliability com-
ponents. The other is to replicate the data base. Both approaches are
potentially expensive.
Multiple-copy technology has other uses besides providing relia-
bility. For example, each of several users located at different places in
a network may require extremely high access speeds to a data base (e.g.,
for searching) , and the data base may change often enough to make
simple periodic updating inadequate. Under these conditions, a scheme
that lets each user have his own copy of the data base and keeps the
copies (essentially) identical would provide powerful capabilities.
Similarly, only those parts of a data base most frequently accessed by
a user might be duplicated at his location, while the network provides
slightly slower access to the rest of the data base.
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Results of this Preliminary Study . We have investigated the
problem of maintaining multiple copies of a data base in a network.
We conclude that it is feasible to design algorithms that will handle
the major difficulties that arise. The algorithms that we propose
(see below) do not solve all problems; further development is needed.
Nevertheless, we feel that our general approach is valid and that a good
start has been made.
i
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Introduction
The need for reliable, survlvable access to a data base occurs
frequently. In a single-computer system, the probability that a parti-
cular data base will be unavailable Is much smaller than the probability
of a complete operating system failure. A general system failure removes
not only the data base, but also Its potential users. In a multiple-
computer network. It Is no longer true that a system failure removes all
the potential users. Hence, failures of the data base proper and of the
system managing it are Indistinguishable from the standpoint of the out-
side user. Since operating systems do fall, we would like to exploit
the lack of correlation between failures of the systems In a network.
By maintaining copies of a data base on different systems, the probability
that at least one copy of a data base Is available at all times can be
made extremely high.
The Environment . Consider the following model (Fig. 1). M
,
M_, ..., M are data base managers. Each controls a data base local to
L m
Itself. These are named D^ , D-, ..., D , respectively. The m managers
are interconnected by a communication network which provides bi-directional
communication between all pairs of managers. U^ , U„, ..., U are data
base users . Each user can communicate with every manager. For simplicity,
we assume this communication takes place over the same communication
network (denoted by N) that the managers use.
The aim is to keep multiple copies of a data base and, in
particular, to keep those copies under the control of different managers.
For simplicity, we assume that all the D are to contain the same infor-
mation.
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The users of the D make two types of request upon the data
base: reading and modification . Reading is further divided into two
categories: critical and noncritlcal. Critical reading is required
to return the most recent Information recorded in any of the D and
must include any updates made previously by the user performing the
read. A noncritlcal read need not fulfill these requirements, though
it may. The noncritlcal read is included as a practical consideration,
since any method providing critical read service supplies noncritlcal
read service. Modification is any operation capable of changing the
response to a subsequent critical read. If modification can involve
access control and similar security devices, noncritlcal reading may
not be allowable, since reading and withdrawal of permission are not
guaranteed to execute in the order in which they were submitted.
Other models and definitions are possible. For example,
our choice of definition for "critical read" is a very strong one.
Some applications do not need this strength and hence would be unwilling
to pay an excessive price for the capability. We have chosen the stronger
definition since it is normally easier to remove capabilities than add
them later. Similarly, our definition of "modification" is quite general,
since we do not want to prematurely restrict the nature of the modifica-
tion.
Previous work . We have mentioned above the use of high-
reliability-components (often with replacement components standing by)
.
This approach is often seen in applications where outages or unavail-
ability are intolerable, such as airline reservation systems or space
flight control systems. Multiple-copy technology until recently has
been largely concerned with archival or backup copying of data bases.
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The main techniques have been periodic copying and journalization of
updates. However, interest has risen recently in the use of multiple
copies of data bases kept as nearly identical as possible at all times,
including times when the data base is being actively updated. This
interest is probably due primarily to the advent of multi-computer net-
works. For example, recent work on the RSEXEC and TIPSER systems at
Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Inc., produced a need for distributed accounting
files; i.e., accounting files residing (in the form of multiple copies of
the files) on several of the computers in a distributed computer network.
In two papers [Johnson and Beeler, 1974], [Johnson and Thomas,
1975], the BBN researchers have described a method which provides the
necessary services. Their environment model is essentially the same as
ours. Each manager is responsible for updating his copy of the data base
on the basis of information received. The key feature of their approach
to maintaining consistency is to store a timestamp with each data item.
The timestamp includes both the time of the most recent change and the
site originating the change. The time is that when the change originated
and is in terms of the originating site's clock. Even though consistency
is maintained (all sites make the same decision as to which change is most
recent), lack of synchronization can cause important updates to be lost.
In addition, Johnson and his coworkers place severe restrictions on the
types of modifications allowed.
The Present Study . In our research on the problem, we have
tried to avoid an approach requiring clock synchronization. We have
also tried to avoid putting constraints on modifications. Our aim has
been to design a very general scheme for maintaining a distributed
data base in a network. We have emphasized generality in order to make
I
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our scheme applicable (with minor modifications) in a wide variety of
contexts.
A primary consideration has been that the algorithms be
designed to allow data base recovery from those types of failures that
occur most frequently. Cost has also been a consideration. We make
no claim to optimality in this regard, however. At this point in time,
we feel that it is appropriate to design systems which are cost competitive
(i.e., which are no more expensive than existing systems), while placing
fewer limitations on users of the system. Finally, it should be noted
that any procedure providing reliable data base maintenance in a network
is necessarily time-consuming. Although we have tried to design algorithms
which are efficient, it may not be feasible to use them for some applica-
tions in a high-delay network.
Research Study; The Model
System Components . In this section, we describe the components
used to implement the algorithm described in later sections. Detailed
descriptions of the functions and interactions of these components will
be described as they are introduced in the algorithm.
We define a user U (Fig. 1) to consist of the following
components (Fig. 2^).
1) An update generator UG :
This unit generates modification requests on the data base
2) A name assignment unit NA..
This unit assigns names to the updates generated by UG .
The requirements on names generated by NA are described
later.
3) A read generator RG .
This unit generates read requests on the data base.
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4) A controller UC..
This unit implements the algorithms used and controls the
rest of the components.
5) An update queue UQ , and
6) an update journal J,.
These are used by UC .
We define a data base manager M (Fig. 3) to contain at least
the following components:
1) A controller MC.
.
1
2) A name assigner MNA.,
We define the data base D, controlled by M, as an arbitrary-
sized collection of data. M. is the sole path to D
. . Failures of the
two are considered indistinguishable. Problems with locking, consis-
tency, etc., which are also present in single-computer systems will not
be explicitly addressed except as they affect the algorithms described
here. M, is responsible for implementing the following two classes of
operation:
1) Read .
This operation is the standard data base read operation.
2) Modification .
Any operation or inseparable sequence of operations which
can change the results of a subsequent read is considered
a modification operation. This definition includes changes
to control information such as security and locks. Limita-
tions on the types of modification allowed are necessary
under some circiomstances to permit recovery from some types
of failure. These will be discussed as appropriate.
i
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The M. is also responsible for the function of serialization of com-
munications via the network. This point is discussed in detail later.
The network N is responsible for two classes of service.
These are:
1) Communication between all pairs of managers.
2) Communication between each user and all managers.
These services could be provided by two networks; however, since the
one network case is a more useful model at present, we have decided to
use it. (The two-network case is not uninteresting and should be con-
sidered at some point, but we will not do so here.) We do not preclude
the possibility that some, or all, of the network communications shown
in Fig. 1 may actually remain in a particular computer. In this case,
N can be thought of as including the interprocess communication facilities
of that computer.
Delays through N . It is a very important point that some
applications cannot operate under conditions of "low" (as measured by
the application) bandwidth and "high" (similarly measured) delay. We
have attempted to produce algorithms that do not greatly affect the
average bandwidth or delay of N experienced by a user, but the requirement
of multiple communications per transaction may introduce a substantial
delay into the processing of a particular transaction.
Research Study; Algorithms for Reading and Modification
In designing these algorithms, it was often necessary to
compromise among speed, cost, and services offered. The choices made
often need explanation, since the consequences of the different alter-
natives are not obvious. We will describe several algorithms which
could be used to perform operations besides recovery, then discuss
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their implications and alternatives. Recovery algorithms are discussed
in detail in the next section.
Primitive operations . We wish to provide the following
operations:
1) Critical read .
A critical read is a read operation which is required to return
the most recent data in any of the copies of the file. If a
user modifies a data base before doing a critical read and the
modification affects the results of that read, then the modifi-
cation must be completed before the read is performed.
2) Noncritical read .
A noncritical read is not bound by either of the above require-
ments. This operation provides a potentially less expensive
means of accessing the data base if the application does not
need guaranteed up-to-date information. Regardless of its
timeliness, data obtained from a noncritical read must be
as consistent as data returned by a critical read.
3) Modification .
Modification is any operation that can cause the response to
a subsequent critical read to change. Any changes made by
any modification operation are eventually reflected in all
copies of the data base. One desires that the changes be
made "as soon as possible", but no more stringent requirement
is imposed.
Algorithms for Reading
Algorithm 1 (critical read) . If appropriate update history
information, such as time or serial number of updates, is stored with
each datum, it is possible to examine copies of a datum and determine
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which is the most recent [Johnson & Beeler, 1974], [Johnson & Thomas,
1975]. This situation permits the following algorithm (ref. Figs. 1
and 2) :
Algorithm 1 (critical read)
1) RG generates a critical read request and submits it to UC
for processing.
2) UC guarantees that any updates it is currently processing
will not affect the result of the read. (This could simply
consist of waiting for all outstanding updates to be finished
if the time lag is acceptable.) Any updates that would must
be allowed to complete first. Note that the read must not
simply use the information in the interfering update - it
must wait for the update to complete.
3) UC sends a copy of the request to each currently active M.
4) Each M performs the requested operation and returns the
requested data to UC along with the associated update history
information.
5) UC examines the update history information and selects the
most recent data from all that returned. These data are then
returned to RG as the result of the read.
Discussion of Algorithm 1 . The selection in step 5 may be
a source of trouble. If only one datum is returned by each M, the
selection is simple. However, if a data set consisting of several
items is returned by each M, or if a different number of data is
returned by different M's, there may be no correct selection (under
our criterion that the most recent data available be returned for a
critical read). In the former case, it is possible for some of the
data returned by a manager M, to be more recent than corresponding
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data returned by another manager M., while the rest of the data from M.
is more recent than corresponding data from M, . Either of the above
problems can occur if no single copy is in possession of all updates at
all times. If either occurs, we cannot be assured of consistency if we
synthesize a reply from the most recent data from each M, even though
each M returns consistent data. Algorithm 1 must be rejected as a
general solution unless we make restrictions on the state of the copies,
the structure of the data base, or the amount of data returned by a read,
We could also modify step 4 of the algorithm to include communication
and synchronization among the copies. We will not discuss this alter-
native, as restricting the state of the copies as described later
offers other advantages; however, it should be investigated.
There are several strong points to algorithm 1. One is
that the amount of communications delay introduced into each trans-
action is minimal. Another is that the non-critical read function
is supplied at optimal speed simply by accepting the data from the
first M to reply. If the critical read function is not needed, or if
the data base structure and updating strategy are appropriately chosen,
this method represents a very simple approach to providing the read
function.
Algorithm 2 (critical read) . If the users of a data base
can be guaranteed that at least one of the copies D of the data
base is completely up to date (i.e., no other D has any more recent
information that D ) at all times, a simpler gorithm can be used
(ref . Figs. 1 and 2)
:
Algorithm 2 (critical read)
1) Same as step 1, algorithm 1.
2) Same as step 2, algorithm 1.
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3) UC sends a copy of the request to M , controller for D , the
known up-to-date ("correct") copy of the data base.
4) M perforins a read function and returns the result to UC.V
5) UC returns the data received from M as the result of theV
critical read operation.
Discussion of algorithm 2 . There are several problems
immediately apparent with this algorithm:
1) M represents a potential bottleneck, as all critical reads
use it.
This is true, but is just as true for every M in Algorithm 1.
It must be determined for a particular application whether the
number of critical read operations performed will saturate a
single M. This problem may be inherent in any similar scheme.
2) Knowledge of, and dependency upon, a distinguished M represents
a severe reliability problem.
Our philosophy is that as long as recovery is possible,
the algorithms should provide as much capability and performance
as at low a cost as possible during normal operation. The
question of recovery is discussed in detail later.
3) It has not been demonstrated that a particular copy of the data
base can be kept up to date.
We present algorithms to assist in performing this function
later.
4) M may not be "close" (in the sense of length of delays caused
by N) to all the users. Hence, some may experience "long"
communication delays
.
This consideration must be examined in the light of the
application and the alternatives. If the application can use
86
noncrltical reads, it can use some closer copy. (See Algorithm
3.) If it must perform critical reads, this algorithm must be
compared to others which provide that function. It should be
noted that this algorithm is no worse than, and is usually better
than. Algorithm 1 with regard to delay.
On the plus side, the algorithm is extremely simple, and requires very
little communication to take place over N. It also causes virtually
no restrictions to be placed on the data base, since N simply introduces
a delay into the normal read operation performed by the M. If this delay
is acceptable, the data base need not be affected.
Algorithm 3 (non-critical read) . The simplest implementation
possible is very desirable for this operation, since many applications
can use it for the majority of their read operations (ref. Figs. 1 and 2);
Algorithm 3 (non-critical read)
1) RG generates a non-critical read request and submits it to UC
for processing.
2) UC chooses, using some unspecified metric, the "best" M (e.g.,
the M which it decides will give the fastest response) ; call
itM^.
3) UC sends a copy of the request to M .
fi
4) M performs a standard read operation on its copy of the data
base, D„, and returns the result to UC.
5) UC returns the data from M as the result of the read operation.
Discussion of algorithm 3 . This algorithm is quite straight-
forward, with the exception of step 2. A suitable implementation of
step 2 would probably take into account some or all of the points on
the following incomplete list:
1) Are UC and some M physically located on the same machine?
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2) What are the network delays at present?
3) What are the queuing delays in the M's?
4) Is there a monetary cost advantage to using a particular M?
5) Are there load sharing advantages to be gained by using a
particular M?
Algorithm for Modification
The following algorithm permits modification to the copies
of a data base to be performed in such a way that at least one of the
copies of the data base reflects every update made to all the other
copies; i.e., one copy is up-to-date or "correct". We will refer to
this copy as D ; it is controlled by M . An alternative approach is
examined in [Johnson & Beeler, 1974] and [Johnson & Thomas, 1975]. We
feel that the loss of generality incurred by their scheme neutralizes
the improvement in performance they achieve by allowing updates to
occur at any time to any of the copies of the data base. Our scheme
also provides a master copy of the data base, i.e., a copy which con-
tains the most up-to-date information available from any of the copies.
In many applications, this is a very important point. The advantages
of generality and the master copy are offset by the disadvantages that
the method may be difficult and/or expensive to implement in some
environments, and that it places great reliance on the master copy,
which then becomes a weak point. The former disadvantages must be
evaluated after considering the cost of alternative techniques, or
the cost of not having the facility. We feel that the effect of the
latter disadvantage can be reduced to an adequate level given an
adequate recovery technique and an environment sufficiently reliable
that recovery does not become a major activity. We describe a proposed
recovery scheme in the next section.
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The algorithm for modification (or "update") is described
in several sections for ease of presentation.
Algorithm 4 (user modification submission) . This algorithm
is performed by the user as the first step in the modification operation
(ref . Figs. 1 and 2):
Algorithm 4 (user modification submission)
1) UG generates an update and submits it to NA for name assignment.
2) NA assigns the update a name from the name space it controls,
then submits the named update to UC for processing.
3) UC sends a copy of the request to M , the current controller
of the "correct" copy of the data base.
Discussion of algorithm 4 . Step 2, the name assigning, is
one of the most crucial steps in the modification algorithm. There
are several conditions on the name that must be fulfilled for recovery
to be possible:
1) The names must be capable of being ordered.
2) The names must be assigned in monotonic increasing or decreasing
order.
3) No name can be assigned which may be in use at any other point
in the entire network.
The name used by Johnson & Beeler [1975] and Johnson & Thomas [1975] is
the local time at the NA, concatenated with site name. This does fulfill
our requirements. Another simple scheme which makes some failures easier
to detect and recover from is to sequentially number each update, then
concatenating the site name. Thus, a lost or missed update can always be
easily detected. With either scheme, great care is necessary to insure
that the monotonicity and uniqueness requirements are never violated, as
recovery may become impossible.
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Algorithm 5 (UC recovery assurance) . This Is the algorithm
that UC uses In performing step 3 of algorithm 4 so that sufficient
Information Is retained to effect recovery In case M falls. The
recovery algorithms are discussed later. (Ref. Figs 1 and 2.)
Algorithm 5 (UC recovery assurance)
1) UC receives an update P from NA.
2) UC places a copy of P Into a local store UQ.
3) UC sends a copy of P to M .
4) M returns an acknowledgement of receipt of P, along with the
name It has assigned to P. (See step 2, Algorithm 6.)
5) UC places this name Into UQ with the previously stored Infor-
mation about P.
6) At some time later, UC receives a communication from M Indl-V
eating that some or all of the copies are updated.
7) UC removes P from UQ. If all copies were updated, P Is discarded.
Otherwise, P Is journalized.
Discussion of Algorithm 5 . The mechanics of this algorithm
are simple, but the reasons behind the steps of the algorithm are not
always obvious. Most of these will become clear when recovery Is
discussed. Purposely omitted from this algorithm are timeout, retry,
and failure detection mechanisms. Such mechanisms can easily be fitted
Into this scheme, but a great variety of techniques could be used.
One function that must be provided by such schemes Is that of assessing
the correct functioning of M . (For example, If no acknowledgements
ever return from M , It may be assumed broken.) This problem overlaps
heavily with that of producing resilient protocols. (See Resilient
Protocol chapter of this report.)
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Algorithm 6 (D modification and distribution of updates) .
This is the algorithm executed by M . It handles name assignment,
update distribution, updating D , and interactions with U (ref . Figs. 1,
2, and 3).
Algorithm 6 (D modification and distribution of updates)
1) MC receives an update P from (some) UC.
2) MNA assigns a unique name to P and sends this name back to
UC. (See step 4, Algorithm 5.) This name is henceforth
considered an integral part of P.
3) MC applies P to D, the data base it controls.
4) MC journalizes P in MJ if one or more of the other M's is not
functioning. (In most environments, P would be journalized
in any event for local backup purposes.)
5) MC sends a copy of P to all other functioning M's and initializes
a counter to the number of M's it sent P to.
6) Eventually, each M returns a reply to MC indicating completion
of P. As each reply arrives, the counter is decremented.
When all M's have replied, the counter will be zero.
7) When the counter becomes zero, MC sends a message to UC indi-
cating that the processing of P is complete (see step 6,
Algorithm 5) , and whether the update was distributed to all
existing copies.
Discussion of Algorithm 6 . The name assignment operation
performed by MNA in step 2 must obey the same restrictions as NA
(ref. Algorithm 4 discussion). The assignment of names represents a
serialization of the incoming updates, one of the most important advan-
tages gained by using a central facility. Without this serialization
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of updates (e.g., in an environment in which updates are sent to an
arbitrary M, which then distributes them to the rest of the M's), restric-
tions on the types of modification operations which can be allowed are
necessary. If restrictions are not made, modifications applied to different
copies of the data base in a different order can yield differences in the
copies. Johnson and Beeler [1974] and Johnson and Thomas [1974] discuss
this approach. As we will see in the Recovery section, there are still
problems that are not solved by Algorithm 6. In some applications, these
problems will require restrictions on the operations which can be performed
during some failure situations.
This application of the update P to the data base D in step 3
may be a highly complex operation involving a great deal of work (e.g.,
searching). The effort required at each of the slave M's to perform
an update may be reduced by "pre-digesting" the update before the distri-
bution in step 5.
Algorithm 7 (slave M operation) . This is the controlling
algorithm obeyed by all M , where i is not equal to v. We refer to
such M's as "slave" M's because they perform modification operations
only at the direction of M .
•^ V
Algorithm 7 (slave M operation)
1) MC receives an update P from M .
2) Same as step 3, algorithm 6.
3) Same as step 4, algorithm 6.
4) MC sends a reply to M indicating completion of applying P.
Discussion of Algorithm 7 . This algorithm can be implemented
by performing those operations in Algorithm 6 which do not appear in
Algorithm 7 conditionally, depending upon whether the M executing it
is M or a slave.
V
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Discussion common to algorithms 6 and 7 . In order to be able
to recover from a failure of some M, several conditions must hold:
1) Any modification to a D which would leave the data base in an
unknown or inconsistent state if interrupted must be atomic or
recoverable (see below) . This requirement is also true of any
single-site data base application.
2) If the modification operation is not of an absolute assignment
and deletion nature (i.e., in case re-application will cause
an error) , the names of the latest updates from each user and
from M must be updated in the same atomic operation that applies
those updates to the data base. Otherwise, updates could be re-
applied during the recovery phase, causing errors that are
difficult to discover and recover from. Again, if it is not
possible to guarantee atomic updating, recoverability is suffi-
cient.
By "recoverable", we mean that a post-failure recovery mechanism can
discover the extent of the damage, and undo or complete the operation
in progress when the failure occurred. Such algorithms are relatively
easy to devise for specific applications, but generally cost several
extra references to a reliable secondary storage medium. We are
assuming that the atomic updating requirement can be met, for example,
by using a scheme such as that described by Chu and Ohlmacher [1974]
in connection with a different problem.
Research Study; Recovery from Failure
Causes of failure . The failures experienced by the complex
of data base managers and users can be usefully divided into two classes,
according to cause:
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1) Failures caused by the network N.
These failures fall into two categories:
a) Complete loss of communication by one or more com-
ponents .
b) Separation of the network into two or more operating
but non-connected networks. This is called parti-
tioning of the network.
Failures of both types may exist simultaneously at different
places in the network.
2) Failures caused by component failures.
These failures are generally uncorrelated and can occur at
any time. For our purposes, component failures can include
network failures that affect only one component.
There are several levels of difficulty in recovering from these failures
and combinations of them. An approximate ordering (beginning with the
simplest) of several of these is:
1) Single failures. (Usually component failure.)
2) Simultaneous failure of two or more components. (Usually, but
not necessarily, network failure.)
3) Sequential failure of two or more components.
4) Failures during recovery.
5) Partitioning of the network into two or more subnetworks, each
with at least one user and at least one copy of the data base.
We will describe the ramifications of some of these problems, and the
recovery techniques and requirements of each, after first describing
some underlying mechanisms
.
Detection of failure . There is a spectrum of particular
failures that falls under each of the broad categories outlined above.
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Some uniform methods of handling errors must be developed in order to
cope with any possible problem. We define two classes of failure.
1) Loss of bi-directional communication.
The use of resilient protocols (see the resilient protocol
chapter of this report), with timeouts, re-transmission,
and other error-control schemes, will detect this situation
if it arises. (Loss of communication in one direction only
can be similarly detected, though resilient procedures for
identifying the erring party must be carefully defined to
guarantee success.) The loss of bi-directional communica-
tion is a manifestation of any total failure of any component
involved in the exchange; hence, such failures form a class.
2) Violation of protocol or other incorrect operation.
This can include violation of a naming rule, failure to
reply or incorrect response to certain types of communica-
tion, or exceeding some timeout period. The important
point is that some component is performing its function
improperly. The decision as to whether the failing compo-
nent is the one which detected the supposed error or the
one that perpetrated it is a difficult and complex one
in many cases. In order to proceed, we assume that
the component which decides that another component is in
error is, in fact, correct in that assertion. In practice,
a second independent check should be made if possible to
reduce the likelihood of a wrong decision. This problem
is theoretically messy, but is relatively straightforward
to adequately solve in practice; more insight into this
problem will arise from an actual implementation.
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Once a component has been found to be failing, it must
be removed from service. The easiest mechanism to use is
to cause the component to simulate a genuine failure, thus
causing the failure recovery machinery to take over. If
the component will not commit suicide, it must be forcibly
i
removed from operation. This represents a significant pro- "
blem for several reasons:
a) Who will be given the power to remove whom?
b) What if the component does not realize, and cannot
be made to realize, that it is broken? It may
attempt to carry on normal operations while all
components are attempting to recover from its loss.
Worse, it may decide the recovering components are
broken and attempt to remove them.
These problems exist in any large system; they are not unique
to this application. Further treatment of this subject would
be facilitated by experimentation and modeling.
We will assume, for expediency, that component malfunction
is indistinguishable from total failure. This assumption is
known to be a gross over-simplification.
We must also make assumptions about the possession of knowledge
about failures:
1) All components know when they have failed.
This assumption is necessary so that a component can take
recovery actions.
2) M is responsible for collecting and distributing information
about components other than itself.
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Thus, since all users except those doing non-critical reads
communicate only with M , they can know about the loss of,
for example, one of the active M's as soon as it affects
them. Those users performing non-critical reads must dis-
cover for themselves when the M they are using breaks.
(They can then perform M a service by informing it of a
suspected failure.)
A very important problem is the agreement of all involved
components on the status of a given component. This is the rationale
behind assumption 2 above. Operation or recovery without this agree-
ment could cause non-uniform treatment of, for example, very-short-
duration failures.
We do not wish to rule out the use of human intervention
in failure detection and recovery. This is particularly true in types
of failure in which the data base managers simply lack the information
or logic to correctly resolve an ambiguity. We do not assume such
assistance, but feel it should be possible to obtain and use it.
Recovery from single failures . This is the easiest recovery.
There are three cases to consider:
1) Failure of a U.
Any operation begun before U failed will complete. No
recovery on the part of the M is necessary. The U itself,
however, must save some information for restarting and
recovery. At a minimum, this includes the previous state
of UQ, J, and NA. When U restarts, it must obey the recovery
algorithm used when M has failed (see below) since M may
have failed while the U was out of service. When a U begins
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recovery operations, it may be necessary for it to refer to
its journal to restore the current M to the state the oldV
M was in with respect to U when the failure occurred.
2) Failure of an M which is not M .V
Such a failure is detected by M and sent to all M's.
V
Eventually, the M is revived. All working M's will have
been journalizing their updates; hence, any other M can
bring the failed M up to date from its journal. The minimum
information required for recovering is the data base (in
some consistent state) and the name assigned by M to the
latest update applied to that data base. This name suffices
to permit the journal of some M to be applied to the failed
M. (Ref. Fig. 3.)
Algorithm 8 (Non-M M recovery)
1) M selects an M, call it >L, to restore the failed M, M^,
from its journal. M could choose itself, i.e., R could equal
v. M^ is not yet considered to be working.
2) M^ sends M^ the name of the last update it applied.
3) M^ starts sending updates with names assigned later than the
name in step 2 to M^. M also sends M^ all updates it sends
4) M^ applies updates sent by M^ to D using Algorithm 7, and
saves only the name of updates sent by M . At some point,
M^ reaches the end of its journal. Any updates sent by >L
after this point will be the same as the updates being sent
by M .
^ v
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5) K_ eventually gets an update from M which is named later than
(or the same as) the ones from M^ . M^ then notifies M . M^,
begins using updates from M instead of M^.
6) M tells M^ to stop sending updates to M_ and changes the status
of I'L, to working. All U's and M's are notified of this change,
and may then stop journalizing.
This algorithm depends on several conditions for success:
a) The rate of updating of M^ must be fast enough to
eventually catch up.
b) In step 5, it is necessary for Mp, to receive some
update from M before it receives the same update
from M^ in order for the algorithm to terminate.
Fulfillment of the first condition depends upon the amount of
traffic experienced by M . It would be possible to slow down
the treatment of incoming traffic at M to give recovering M's
a chance to catch up. The second condition can be satisfied
if all updates distributed by M are first sent to the
V
recovering M's, then to the working M's. Alternatively, M
itself could be used as M^, solving the problem completely.
3) Failure of M .V
The failure of the central controller is a potentially serious
problem. If no other components fail at the same time,
recovery is straightforward. The state information required
by other M's to replace M must include the following: the
state of the naming of updates (i.e., last name given out)
and the order in which other M's are selected to replace M .
V
The latter is distributed by M to the other M's in the form
' V
of a successor list . The first item is the only one that
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causes any trouble, since the other information can be part
of the routine communication between M's. M may have been
in the process of sending out some newly-named updates when
it failed; hence, no other M may be aware of the correct last
name assigned. We can recover from this situation by using
the information possessed by U's as well as M's.
Algorithm 9 (Assignment of new M )
1) When an M notices that M failed, it consults its successor list
V
of M's. It sends a message to the next M on the list. The mes-
sage includes the time at which the successor list it used was
generated by M .
2) All M's which received messages send a message to all M's
asserting their position (i.e., asking to be acknowledged as
the new M ) and include the time at which the successor listV
whose authority they are using was generated.
3) Each M replies yes or no to each of the messages sent in (2)
,
depending on whether or not that is the latest time it has
seen in any such message.
4) One M will receive nothing but "yes" votes. All others will
receive at least one no vote. The M which received all yes
votes declares itself to be the new M and initiates recovery
operations,
Algorithm 10 (M recovery)
1) The new M sends a message to all U's advising them of the
recovery in progress.
2) Each U sends M every update in UQ that was not signaled to
be complete.
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3) M orders these on the names and applies those it has not
seen before. Unnamed updates are queued for eventual pro-
cessing.
4) When all U's have replied, and all named updates have been
applied, the unnamed updates are processed by algorithm 6.
There is little to be discussed about these algorithms. Algorithm 9
is a typical robust decision algorithm, without allowances for erroneous
operation by its components. Algorithm 10 applies the same sequence
of updates to the new M as was applied to the old, which helps insure
consistent results from critical reads and makes recovery of the old
M easier.
V
Multiple-failure recovery . Because of the great variety
of failures that can arise, we will not attempt to describe precise
algorithms for recovery. Instead, we will describe major problems
which arise and how the recovery must be structured to take these
problems into account. The models and algorithms described above can-
not support all types of recovery in all applications. Significant
changes to those algorithms and models will be proposed in some cases
to increase the range of applicability of the techniques.
Failures during recovery . Since additional failures can
occur while recovery operations are in progress, two important require-
ments arise:
1) Several recovery operations can be in progress without affecting
each other.
2) Every step of all recovery operations must always leave compo-
nents in states indistinguishable from those arising from ordi-
nary failures.
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The latter requirement removes the need for special treatment of
failures during recovery. It also makes it possible to simply scrap
a recovery and start over at virtually any time a problem arises.
Missing updates . In the model shown, and with the algorithms
described, a serious problem arises in many failure situations. If M
and one or more U's fail at the same time, there may be updates known
only to those U's and M . When recovery takes place, names previously
assigned to updates now inaccessable get reassigned by the new M
,
and a violation of the naming rule has occurred. One solution to this
problem is for M to send all updates to the other M's as soon as the
names are assigned but before sending those names back to U or otherwise
processing them. Each M stores each update until M tells it to
proceed with that update. If M fails, the other M's have possession
of all updates that M was working on. Appropriate checks would have
to be made to ensure that the U did not resubmit updates, but this
simply involves using the U's own name for the update as identification.
Many details of this scheme remain to be worked out.
The scheme above has several shortcomings for implementation:
1) Preprocessing of updates is more complex.
2) More storage is needed at the M's to store updates. However,
U's no longer need to journalize.
3) More time elapses between submission and completion of an
update.
Additionally, it may be unnecessary in many cases. In a large number
of applications, the updates of each user affect other users very little,
and the loss of an update until the user can resubmit it may be accept-
able. In general, however, this cannot be assumed. Further study in
this area is needed.
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Reconciliation of copies . If the network partitions into
several noncommunicating, but still operable, networks, and at least
two of these have one or more M's and one or more U's, a serious pro-
blem can arise. If the U's in such a situation are allowed to perform
arbitrary operations, the various copies of the data base may become
irreconcilable, even if all M's keep complete journals of their updates.
This is because the serialization function of M has been lost. This
V
situation is very much like that discussed by Johnson and Beeler [1974]
and Johnson and Thomas [1975], and their analysis of the operations
allowable apply whenever it is suspected that a partition exists.
If limiting the operations allowed when partitions are
suspected is not an acceptable choice, or if software errors manifest
themselves, the data base copies may become irreconcilably different.
A practical reconciliation scheme to restore the integrity of the
copies must be available.
Conclusions and Plans for Future Work
A set of models and algorithms has been presented which begins
to address the problem of maintaining duplicate copies of data bases in a
network environment. The approach taken in this study has several pro-
blems, including:
1) The speed of the algorithms is low.
2) The cost to produce and to operate the scheme is high.
3) The missing update problem is not satisfactorily solved.
4) Unnoticed problems probably exist, since detailed analysis
and implementation have not been performed.
However, the approach seems to be viable, and further research and
development is appropriate.
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Several significant aspects of the problem have not been
investigated. These include, but are certainly not limited to, the
following:
1) Multiple networks.
This would have the effect of causing more frequent
correlated failures, and causing failures which would
be highly improbable in a single network to be routine.
2) Use of synchronization and coordination between managers to
reduce bandwidth requirements and simplify algorithms.
3) Module error detection and recovery.
How is a decision made as to who is broken when an
apparent error condition arises? More importantly, how
is the situation resolved so operations can continue?
This subject is closely linked to resilient protocol
technology, and a transfer of that technology would
probably help solve the problem.
4) Careful treatment of the missing update problem.
5) Analysis of deadlock situations.
Several opportunities for deadlock may have been added
to those already present in the M's.
We also believe that the implementation of the general scheme we have
described will indicate significant unanticipated areas of research
which should be investigated.
A practical implementation of this scheme requires computing
power to be associated with each user. The usual method of doing this
is to put the users on some large computer, often one also supporting
a copy of the data base. It appears that an intelligent terminal could
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provide more reliable, survivable, and cost-effective access to the
data base than the large-system approach. To take full advantage of the
lower complexity and subsequent higher reliability of an intelligent
terminal, the terminal would have to be able to connect directly to
the network, without an intervening large system.
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Terminal Resident Processing
Summary
The problem . Computer networks simultaneously facilitate
access to computer resources and place new demands on the users of these
resources. Each computer system has its own idiosyncrasies, its own
rituals that must be followed. These idiosyncrasies can range from
unintelligible user codes to alphabet soup for the names of application
programs. Perhaps the worst problem posed by the proliferation of
computer systems is the lack of uniformity in their human interfaces.
Each system, and usually each application package, has its own conven-
tions for input, output, and names. A user who is proficient in the use
of one system cannot be certain that his experience will be an asset
when he switches to a different system. It is hoped that a computer
terminal with a small dedicated processor and some local storage capa-
bility can substantially aid the user in his interactions with a large
computer system. The terminal, acting as an agent of the user, can
facilitate the two-way human-computer interface and handle those tasks
(e.g., login and job control languages) which are not directly related
to the user's mission.
In addition to relieving the user from the vagaries of com-
puter systems, there are preliminary indications that an intelligent
terminal can offer cost, performance, and survivability benefits. In a
Harvard study, some simple data management tasks were moved off of a
large IBM-370/168 on to several minicomputers which supported the
individual user terminals [1] . The combination of the large host data
management system cooperating with the minicomputer supported terminals
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was significantly more responsive and significantly less expensive than
the terminals supported only by the large host. If a modest amount of
local storage (e.g., floppy disk) is made available at the terminal
along with local processing capabilities, then a user would be able to
continue processing local data, albeit with reduced capabilities, if the
large host computer or communication link fails.
Results of this preliminary study . A PDP-11 supported terminal
was configured for this study. A simple software system was developed
to help understand the software environment and the difficulty of con-
figuring an "intelligent terminal".
The software required to support the experimental intelligent
terminal was much simpler and much smaller than anticipated. This soft-
ware was simplified because it was dedicated to serving a single user in
an exceedingly benign software environment.
Further investigation is appropriate in several areas. The
range of application of intelligent terminals in a computer network is
very broad. The kinds of processing which are appropriate to intelligent
terminals, network front-ends and large hosts and when and how processing
responsibilities are to be shifted between them are not clear. The
interface between intelligent terminals and existing data systems will
require much more work. New systems will have to be designed to exploit :
the symbiotic relationship between an intelligent terminal and a large
host
.
The potential of intelligent terminals to improve cost, performance,
reliability, and the human interface is impressive. The achievement of
this potential will require further research and development.
f
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Introduction
Human interface . The interface between computer systems and
their human users is notoriously poor. Far too few systems devoted
enough effort in this area when they were designed and implemented.
Retrofitting more satisfactory interfaces is prohibitively expensive.
An alternative solution to the problem is to employ intelligent terminals
as filters between a system and its users. This approach is at once
simpler and potentially more powerful than retrofitting a new interface
to an existing system. It is simpler since it does not require modify-
ing the existing system; more powerful since the terminal with its
dedicated CPU can provide capabilities (e.g., graphics) that would
consume too much of a major system's capacity. The next few paragraphs
describe some ways in which an intelligent terminal can improve the
human interface.
Graphic displays . There are many ways of presenting information
to a user. The most common method used by computer systems is some form
of tabular output. This is adequate for many applications, but tabular
output does not always provide the full impact of the data. Other
display styles, such as histograms, line graphs, and bar charts, can
provide a greater visual impact to the user, and effectively increase
the amount of information presented to him. However, most existing
application packages do not provide these display alternatives. There
are two major reasons for this. First, most user terminals do not have
graphic capabilities (with the exception of crude alphameric histograms).
Furthermore, most remote graphics terminals are so slow that presenting
a graphic display requires a full minute or more. Second, the conversion
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of numeric data into a displayable graphic format is costly in terms of
processor consumption. It simply is not cost-effective to devote a
significant fraction of a multi-million dollar computer system to pro-
ducing graphic output for a single user.
The use of an intelligent terminal eliminates both of these
barriers to graphics. Without modifying any existing system, the
terminal with an inexpensive embedded processor can intercept tabular
output and transform it into virtually any graphic format. This will
not further impact the host computer system, yet will provide the user
with the advantages of graphic output. Since display generation is
local and does not require remote communications, the speed of output to
the user's display device can be extremely high.
Touch panel . The input to virtually all interactive computer
systems is by means of some typewriter-like keyboard. There are two
drawbacks to this method of input. First, it is very prone to mistakes,
since most people are not competent typists. Second, the format of
input to an application system is typically fixed, and not always in a
fashion intuitively reasonable to the user. Since most application
systems are not tolerant of violations of their input format, the user
must be thoroughly familiar with each of the systems he uses. This
presents a problem to the casual user who might only use a system once
or twice a year, and also to the prolific user who uses so many different
systems that he can't remember the proper format for each individual
system.
By combining a touch-sensitive input mechanism overlayed on a
graphic display device, the intelligent terminal can address these
problems. Rather than forcing the user to type in some complicated
syntax, the terminal can display all the options that are currently
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available; the user selects the ones he wants by touching the option
with his finger. There is no problem of mistyping the input, and no
possibility of violating syntax since only syntactically correct options
are displayed. The user is thus relieved of the necessity to develop
the mechanical skill of typing, and he will not have to undergo the
period of training and frustration which typically accompanies an
attempt at learning (or relearning) a computer system.
Multiple displays . The terminal processor can support several
displays. For example, the primary display device can be located in the
user's normal line of vision, and provide the graphic and touch capability
described above. One or more secondary displays can be placed at the
side of his field of vision. These secondary displays can be used to
provide a constant flow of text and figures that explains the infor-
mation being shown on the main display. If the user is confused or
needs help at any point in the session, he looks to the help screen and
finds a "manual" open to the right page. His attention would not be
distracted by any "split-screen" techniques, or by having to hunt through
a system manual for the information he needs. Yet another display could
serve as a scratch pad, allowing the user to record notes, comments or
previous results in a convenient place. The secondary displays could
provide the same touch and graphics capabilities as the main display.
Cost and performance improvements
. Intelligent terminals can
provide benefits other than the improvement of the human interface. It
is recognized that some common functions, most notably input and output,
are handled as well by small computers as large ones. If the inexpensive
terminal processor can relieve the larger host processor from such
tasks, then a greater portion of the expensive large system can be
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devoted to those functions which it handles best. This offloading of
the host will result in an increased capability to handle users; it will
perform like a larger system. Preliminary studies indicate that significant
improvements in system performance can be realized concurrently with a
reduction in the overall cost of using the system. The general applicability
of these results needs to be investigated, as do other symbiotic relation-
ships between an intelligent terminal and a large host.
Survivability . As was mentioned above, frequently used data
may be stored at the terminal. If the intelligent terminal is designed
so that all of its operation does not depend on the host, the user can
still work with local but reduced processing ability, when the host is
not available. Related functions which a stand-alone terminal might
provide include updating and displaying local data, entering new data,
and transmitting all changes in the data base to the remote host when it
is revived after host or communication failure.
Terminal hardware requirements . It is apparent that the CPU
of an intelligent terminal must provide both integer and floating point
hardware, and that it must be capable of handling medium sized blocks of
data. Whether hardware mechanisms to protect the intelligent terminal
software from user-supplied code should be provided and the advisability
of providing virtual memory is not known. The size, speed, and address
architecture requirements of terminal memories are open questions. The
type, capacity, and speed of mass storage devices will be dictated to
some extent by the intended use of the intelligent terminal. The number
and type of displays are also questions. Requirements for animation,
refresh rate, color, resolution, and interfacing must be evaluated.
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Terminal software requirements . The software required to
Implement the Intelligent terminal can be broken Into two categories.
The first Is a small-scale operating system that provides the low-level
support necessary to handle the various devices and interfaces of the
intelligent terminal. This operating system can be quite small, and
presents no conceptual or technological difficulties. The second is the
application software. This Includes the software to Interface with the
remote host system and forms the "intelligent" portion of the intelli-
gent terminal. This code will be highly Implementation dependent; its
size and configuration will be based on the Intended use of the intelli-
gent terminal.
Study goals . The purpose of this study was to Increase our
understanding of intelligent terminals for data management applications.
Specific goals included an understanding of memory size requirements,
design difficulties and implementation difficulties for both low-level
support and application level software. This was done by building a
demonstration system using borrowed hardware on short term loan, the
ARPA network and a Multlcs-resident data management as the large host
target.
The Research Study
Hardware base . The CPU used in the preliminary research study
is a Digital Equipment Corporation PDP-11 Model 10. This particular
PDP-11 is equipped with 20K words of core memory, a high-speed plasma
panel display with a touch-sensitive overlay, an ASCII keyboard, a dual
DECtape transport for local mass storage, and various communications
interfaces (figure 1). This particular configuration was assembled
primarily on the basis of component availability rather than suitability.
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Intelligent Terminal Hardware
Suitability of the hardware base . The PDP-11/ 10 is a medium-
speed minicomputer. However, it is not a particularly powerful one. It
has no capability to handle floating-point data, so all arithmetic
operations are performed on integers. This lack is not particularly
harmful in a demonstration environment, but a full-scale intelligent
terminal will require floating-point hardware to be of maximum utility.
A more serious flaw in the PDP-11/10 is its lack of integer multiply and
divide instructions. Consequently, these common operations must be
emulated by software routines. Aside from these two drawbacks, the PDP-
11 is an adequate base for the intelligent terminal. It is a flexible
machine, and it is extremely easy to interface special-purpose devices
to a PDP-11.
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The high-speed plasma display was developed at the University
of Illinois. The panel used was 512x512 dots at 60 dots/inch resolution.
Each dot on the 8 1/2" square screen can be written and erased independ-
ently. It is a high contrast display (orange dots on a black background),
and since it is a storage-type display that does not need to be constantly
refreshed, there is no flicker effect. When operating at top speed the
entire screen can be filled in about 1/3 second. These characteristics
make the plasma panel an excellent device for displaying textual and
graphic data.
The mass-storage device on the experimental intelligent terminal
consists of two DECtape drives. DECtape is a low-speed substitute for
magnetic tape, and has only moderate storage capacity. It is not well
suited to the task of mass storage; we used it because it was the only
device available to us. Any of the floppy disks or low-cost fixed-head
disks that are available coimnercially would be a far more appropriate
medium for mass storage in a full-scale intelligent terminal.
Software . There are three categories of software for the
intelligent terminal. The first is the operating system kernel. This
consists of device drivers, process creation and deletion primitives,
and process synchronization primitives. The second is support software.
This includes file management code, the input-output system, and application-
oriented programs such as graph routines and a general purpose picture
drawing routine. The last is the actual application software; this is
the "intelligent" portion of the intelligent terminal. The hierarchical
structure just outlined is completely conceptual, since there are no
hardware or software mechanisms to enforce such distinctions.
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IOperating system kernel . The operating system used the disjoint
process as the basic functional unit. As Implemented by this operating
system, a process Is simply a procedure (called the process procedure)
which has Its own stack. The operating system provides a virgin stack
to the first procedure executed In each process. Any procedures Invoked
by the process procedure will use that stack for storing their local
data. A benefit of using this method for local storage Is that each ^
1
procedure Is reentrant ( I.e. , more than one Invocation of a procedure
may be active). Since each process has a separate stack, the address of 9|
the stack Is used to uniquely Identify each process. _
I
The entire operating system Is queue-driven. Each process has
an Input queue from which It reads Its commands, and there Is a queue of
processes which are ready to execute. Any process which Is not on the
ready queue Is blocked waiting for some event to occur, and Is on a
queue associated with that event. The mechanism for blocking processes
uses the generalized semaphores and P and V operations proposed by
Dljkstra [2]. Each semaphore consists of a queue of waiting processes
and a count of how many processes are waiting. When a process needs
access to some semaphore-controlled resource. It performs the P operation
on the semaphore. If the resource Is available, the process Is allowed
to proceed; If It is not available, the process Identifier Is added to
the semaphore's queue and another process Is selected for execution.
When the process that Is currently using the resource Is finished with
It, It must perform the V operation on the semaphore. If any processes
J
are queued on the semaphore, the first one Is removed and placed on the
queue of ready processes.
J
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The scheduler selects the next process to run. It removes a
process identifier from the ready queue, and makes the stack of that
process become the current stack. Since there is no priority ordering
of processes, the first one on the queue is selected. The operation of
the scheduler is interesting. It is invoked as an ordinary procedure;
so the most recent entry on the stack is the call to the scheduler.
After switching to the new stack, it merely performs a normal procedure
return. This returns to the calling procedure in the new process, which
then continues normally.
Creating a process is very straightforward. First, core for
the process stack is obtained from the dynamic memory allocator. This
block of core is then formatted to look like a stack, which entails
setting four words of control information. Then the stack is modified
to appear as if the process procedure had called the scheduler. Finally
the stack address is added to the ready queue. When the newly created
process is selected for execution, the scheduler "returns" to the first
instruction of the process procedure. Destroying a process is still
simpler. All that is required is to free the core occupied by the stack
and invoke the scheduler. The scheduler will select some other process
to execute, and the old process simply disappears. This mechanism works
because there is no way for one process to preempt another, which quarantees
the integrity of the old stack until the process has actually gone away.
A process can destroy itself either by intentionally calling the process
deletion procedure or by returning from the process procedure, which is
equivalent
.
The kernel of the operating system is extremely small. It
requires about 800 16-bit words. Table 1 shows the various modules of
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the kernel along with their sizes. It is worth mentioning that the
entire kernel, with the exception of the scheduler, is written in a
high-level language.
Table 1
Operating System Kernel Modules
Function # of Procedures
Code Size
(16-bit words)
Data Size
(16-bit words)
Dynamic memory
management
2 112 120
Scheduler 2 (1 Assembly
language)
58
Process creation
and deletion
2 47 (create)
20 (delete)
7
9
Queue
management
(includes
interprocess
communication)
4 115
Error handling
and recovery
1 117 17
Process
S3mchronization
2 51
Total 13 procedures 520 words 153 words
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Support software . The structure of the I/O system is somewhat
unorthodox. Associated with each device is a handler process. Any
process which wishes to use the device must request the handler process
to perform the actual operations on the device. The handler process
also communicates directly with the interrupt routines for the device.
The unorthodoxy of the I/O system stems from a design decision decreeing
that only one process may "own" a device. That is, if one process owns
a device, any other process wishing to use that device must wait until
the first process voluntarily relinquishes it. This decision eliminates
the need to multiplex the mass storage device and the communication line
to the remote host, but also forces these resources to be underutilized.
The I/O system maintains a table which shows the current owner
of each device and the handler process associated with the device. When
a process requests ownership of a device, this table is inspected to
determine if it is available. If so, the requesting process becomes the
owner, and requests from other processes are denied. If the device is
unavailable, the requesting process has the option of having the I/O
system block him until the device is available or of simply being denied
use of the device at this time.
The functions provided by the I/O system are very commonplace.
They include reading and writing the device and requesting special ser-
vices from the handler process as well as requesting and relinquishing
the device. Also included is a routine that indicates how much data the
handler process currently has. This is useful since all the other
functions of the I/O system are synchronous. That is, a read request
does not return until the data is actually returned. Although other
processes can execute during that period, the process that requested the
I/O service is constrained from running.
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Table 2
I/O System Modules
Function # of procedures
Code Size
(16-bit words)
Data Size
(16-bit words'
Request deuce
ownership
1 127 40
Relinquish
ownership
1 79
Initialize I/O
system
1 34
Read 1 74
Write 1 62
Special
functions
1 69
Peek at buffer
size
1 80
Process
termination
clean-up
1 58
Deuce handler
Process
3 1610 14
Total 11 2193 words 54 words
By far the largest portion of code falls into the category of
general support software. This includes several routines to operate on
the plasma panel, routines to provide formatted output, and routines
that allow the creation and display of arbitrarily complex pictures.
Also included here is the capability to create and display character
sets other than standard ASCII, so the user can display any pattern that
will fit in an 8 X 16 character position.
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Included in the support category is the largest procedure in
the entire system. This is a routine that emulates six hardware in-
structions, including multiply and divide. When one of the non-existent
instructions is executed on the PDP-11/10, it generates a fault which
invokes the emulator routine. When the emulator routine has finished it
returns from the trap in such a fashion that the interrupted procedure
can continue normal execution. The emulator is necessary because the
PDP-11/10 which was used for the study does not provide the six emulated
instructions. The bulk of the operating system was written in a high-
level language whose compiler runs on a larger PDP-11. The compiler
assumes that the code it generates will also run on that machine and so
uses the full instruction set.
Table 3
General Support Modules
Function # of Procedures
Code Size
(16-bit words)
Data Size
(16-bit words)
Plasma panel
management
6 500
Touch panel
management
5 524 2
Picture support 2 242 3
Formatted output 6 437 39
Special Character
output
1 45
Formatted input 1 71
Interrupt
dispatcher
1 (Assembly
language)
33 57
Instruction
emulator
1 (Assembly
language)
350 19
Total 23 2202 120
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The demonstration . The actual intelligent terminal demonstration
designed for the research study is a simple data management system
operating on Illinois land-use data. The bulk of the data resides on
MIT's Multics computer system, which is part of the ARPA network. The
intelligent terminal communicates with the UNIX system at the University
of Illinois; UNIX in turn communicates with Multics via the ARPA network.
For the purposes of the research study, the UNIX system is totally
transparent and may be ignored.
The data at Multics is operated on by a very sophisticated
data management system called Janus. There are over 1400 data items for
each of the 102 counties in Illinois, plus over 200 items for each of
approximately 500 municipalities. For the purposes of the demonstration,
the data base was restricted to 41 data items for each of 30 counties,
and 12 data items for each municipality in the 30 counties.
The demonstration uses the intelligent terminal as a cache
memory for Janus. The user can ask to see the values of 15 data items
for all 30 counties, or to see detailed data about the municipalities in
one county. If the data that the user has requested is already at the
terminal, then he is able to use it immediately. If the data is not
available locally, the terminal will automatically query Janus for it.
The user will then have to wait for the request to be transmitted to
Janus, for Janus to retrieve the data, and for the data to be transmitted
to the terminal before he can use it.
The user is able to display the data currently at the terminal
in a variety of formats, to create new data items that are simple transfor-
mations of the existing data, and to switch from using the current data
on counties to using the current municipality data and back again. The
display formats include a standard tabular report, a bar graph of the
4
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data, or a shaded map. Although the user can modify the data at the
terminal, and indeed create new data from that already existing at the
terminal, these changes are not reflected back to the Janus data base.
It is obviously possible to do so; we did not simply because of the time
constraints of the research study. If the communication line between
the intelligent terminal and Janus should fail for any reason, the user
can still operate on the data currently residing at the terminal.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of this research study
has been to investigate the concepts that underly intelligent terminals,
and not to implement a prototype version of an intelligent terminal.
The choice of a demonstration application is clearly independent of that
purpose; any other demonstration that investigated the intelligent
terminal concept would be equally appropriate.
Conclusions and Plans for Future Research
This research study was primarily concerned with the design
and implementation of an experimental single-user system to act as a
front-end to existing operating systems and data management systems. It
quickly became apparent that there was a wide variety of possible appli-
cations for the intelligent terminal. The assumptions of the benign
environment for the operating system were also questioned.
Benign environment . The operating system was designed assuming
a single user system, no user written programs, and correctly operating
application packages. Therefore, the operating system is not protected
from software errors nor does it have to resolve intra-user conflicts
over resources. If either of the two latter restrictions were relaxed,
(as may occur for large application packages), some mechanism such as
virtual memory or relocation and bounds registers would have to be used
to ensure the integrity of the operating system and system resources.
125
Providing for multiple users adds another level of complexity
to the operating system. Intra-user conflicts, such as arise in resource
sharing and controlling access to data, must be resolved. Considerable
thought has to be given to the respective merits of a single user intelli-
gent terminal vs. a multi-user front-end.
Integration with existing systems
. The intelligent terminal
described above presently serves as a single-user front-end to Janus, an
existing data management system. A data management system in the terminal
interacts with Janus to handle data and commands . Since Janus assumes
that it is interacting with a human, its error messages and prompts are
not easily understood by another computer. Also, since Janus does not
know that it is talking to an intelligent terminal, it cannot, of its
own initiative, take advantage of the local computing power.
For the purpose of the demonstration, a command has been added
to Janus to facilitate cooperation between the two systems. However,
extensive modifications to Janus would be required to take significant
advantage of the terminal.
Full integration with a host . The data management system on
the large host (and possibly the operating system) should know that it
is connected to an intelligent terminal. The host and terminal should
actively load share, each doing what it does best. Considerable effort
is needed to determine what functions the terminal and the host computer
should perform. At one extreme, the host just serves as a data computer -
the requests being formulated at the terminal. At the other extreme,
data of local significance is at the terminal with aggregation and
report functions occurring at the host.
Integration within a network . In an existing network like the
PWIN, powerful computers interact with simple terminals. The intelligent
126
terminal is a special resource midway between these two. The proper
utilization of such a resource in harmony with existing applications,
protocols, and other processing and terminal resources is an area that
needs further study.
Need for modeling effort . In the above sections, several
variables have been introduced which complicate the design of an intelli-
gent terminal. They can be condensed into two problems. First, in a
heterogeneous network with large hosts, multi-user front-ends, and
intelligent terminals, how should responsibilities be distributed?
Second, what do the protocols for communication and decision making look
like when those entities attempt to share resources? It becomes clear
that a modeling effort is required to determine feasible solutions to
the first problem and to quantify the tradeoffs. Then protocols appro-
priate to the feasible and more desirable solutions can be defined.
Other aspects of intelligent terminals . There are other areas
of computer science which impact on intelligent terminal technology and
which were not covered by this study.
1) User authentication . Technology is just beginning to be
developed to allow a system to continuously verify that the user is who
he claims to be. These techniques will probably need local processing
to economically perform their functions.
2) Input . Touch panels have been superficially examined. This
technology and others such as voice input need examining.
3) Cryptography . It may be feasible to encode and decode data at
the terminal and to store it at the large host in ciphered form. The
terminal can assist in securing the communications link by cyphering and
decyphering communications and by generating artificial traffic.
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4) Compression . The feasibility of dynamic or static compression
schemes should be investigated. Compression should substantially reduce
bandwidth requirements
.
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